the place of god in buddhism

People new to Buddhism, especially those who come from a Judeo-Christian background, often ask about the place of God in Buddhism. Many are surprised to learn that most Buddhist traditions and texts don't posit an omnipotent, omniscient, creator god analogous to the Judeo-Christian God, and it seems to me that there are three main reasons why the question of God is basically a non-issue in Buddhism.

Reason #1: According to the texts, a beginning point to samsara (literally 'wandering on') isn't evident (SN 15.3). This can be interpreted two ways — that a beginning point to the continual cycle of death and rebirth of beings isn't evident, or that a beginning point to the continual cycle of death and rebirth of the conceit 'I am,' the self-identification that designates a being (satta), isn't evident — and they're not mutually exclusive. Either way, the point is the same: all that really matters in the here and now is whether suffering is present, and if so, how it can be overcome.

Reason #2: I think it's safe to say that Buddhism is essentially non-theistic in view. However, I also happen to be of the opinion that, if we dig a bit deeper, the idea of a creator God is incompatible with certain aspects and teachings that, if taken to their logical conclusion, seem to reject the idea of, or a need for, a creator God. For one thing, the logic of dependent co-arising, while primarily concerned with the psychological process by which suffering arises in the mind, negates the idea of a creator God in that it precludes a first cause or a causeless cause when applied to cosmology.

Then there's this famous problem of evil passage from the Bhuridatta Jataka (although, to be fair, this is most likely a later addition that some date to the 13th century):

We see those rules enforced before our eyes,
None but the Brahmans offer sacrifice,
None but the Khattiya exercises sway,
The Vessas plough, the Suddas must obey.
These greedy liars propagate deceit,
And fools believe the fictions they repeat;
He who has eyes can see the sickening sight;
Why does not Brahma set his creatures right?
If his wide power no limits can restrain,
Why is his hand so rarely spread to bless?
Why are his creatures all condemned to pain?
Why does he not to all give happiness?

Why do fraud, lies, and ignorance prevail?
Why triumphs falsehood, truth and justice fail?
I count your Brahma one of the unjust among,
Who made a world in which to shelter wrong.
Those men are counted pure who only kill
Frogs, worms, bees, snakes or insects as they will,
These are your savage customs which I hate,
Such as Kamboja hordes might emulate.
If he who kills is counted innocent
And if the victim safe to heaven is sent,
Let Brahmans Brahmans kill so all were well
And those who listen to the words they tell.

At best, God would have be more like the impassive and impersonal God of Aristotle, existing outside of time and space, to find a place within Buddhist cosmology; and anything existing outside of time and space would logically be completely static, meaning that God would be an undynamic being if God exists at all. Since everything within the range of our experience (i.e., within space and time) is subject to change, however, it's more logical to conclude that everything within our realm of experience is impermanent, meaning that for God to able to interact with our universe, God would also be temporal and subject to illness, aging and death just like every other being, hence not God.

Nevertheless, even in the earliest parts of the Pali Canon, there are references to devas or what we might call 'heavenly beings.' However, devas (literally 'radiant ones'), which are often seen as gods when taken literally, are simply non-human beings who are more powerful and long-lived than ordinary humans, and are by no means eternal, omnipresent, omnipotent, etc. (e.g., see DN 1). But more importantly, they can also be viewed metaphorically as the indulgent and hedonistic aspects of our psychology (i.e., the parts that are addicted to sensual pleasures).

In addition, according to AN 3.61, the belief in a supreme being can be unskillful and interfere with Dhamma practice if it leads to the belief that everything a person experiences is due to such a supreme being, a denial of the efficacy of kamma (literally 'action') and a life of inaction:

Having approached the priests & contemplatives who hold that... 'Whatever a person experiences... is all caused by a supreme being's act of creation,' I said to them: 'Is it true that you hold that... "Whatever a person experiences... is all caused by a supreme being's act of creation?"' Thus asked by me, they admitted, 'Yes.' Then I said to them, 'Then in that case, a person is a killer of living beings because of a supreme being's act of creation. A person is a thief... unchaste... a liar... a divisive speaker... a harsh speaker... an idle chatterer... greedy... malicious... a holder of wrong views because of a supreme being's act of creation.' When one falls back on creation by a supreme being as being essential, monks, there is no desire, no effort [at the thought], 'This should be done. This shouldn't be done.' When one can't pin down as a truth or reality what should & shouldn't be done, one dwells bewildered & unprotected. One cannot righteously refer to oneself as a contemplative. This was my second righteous refutation of those priests & contemplatives who hold to such teachings, such views.

Reason #3: In relation to the four noble truths and the practice of the noble eightfold path, the matter of the existence of God is, soteriologically speaking, unnecessary. The impetus of the practice is a strong conviction in the efficacy of actions and the intentions underlying them, not the existence of a supreme being (e.g., see MN 61).

Of course, this doesn't mean that people can't believe in God and still practice the Dhamma, especially some of its more contemplative aspects; but it does mean that, at the very least, such views can negatively impact the practice when held inappropriately. In addition, I understand that a belief in God can provide comfort in difficult times, as well as serve as the basis for a beneficial ethical-spiritual practice. I also accept that certain people may have had some kind of profound spiritual experience that has led them to adopt such beliefs, and I don't have any issues with that myself. (I mean, who am I to argue with someone's personal experiences?)

Moreover, I think one can certainly present Judeo-Christian ideas, or those from any other predominately monotheistic tradition, in a more or less Buddhistic way, and vice versa. As I've often mentioned before, my dear friend Simon shared with me some of his ideas regarding the "excellence of the synthesis of the messages and practices" of Buddhism and Christianity, for example; and people like David Cooper (God is a Verb) and Thomas Merton (Mystics and Zen Masters) seem to continually find harmony between these spiritual disciplines.

And one can't help but notice the similarities between certain Buddhist ideas and those found in Sankara's version of Advaita Vedanta. So much so, in fact, that many of his critics actually accused him of being a Buddhist in disguise. For example, it should be noted that the concept of anatman in Sankara's version of Advaita Vedanta is similar to the Buddhist anatta, quite possibly being derived from it. In one of his commentaries, Sankara writes, "Whenever we deny something unreal, we do so with reference to something real; the unreal snake, e.g. is negatived with reference to the real rope." Sankara essentially used the notion of anatman to deny the reality of the individual self (atman) in favour of Brahman.