Puna caparaṃ, bhante, idhekacco samaṇo vā brāhmaṇo vā ātappamanvāya…pe… tathārūpaṃ cetosamādhiṃ phusati, yathāsamāhite citte imameva kāyaṃ uddhaṃ pādatalā adho kesamatthakā tacapariyantaṃ pūraṃ nānappakārassa asucino paccavekkhati – ‘atthi imasmiṃ kāye kesā lomā…pe… lasikā mutta’nti. Atikkamma ca purisassa chavimaṃsalohitaṃ aṭṭhiṃ paccavekkhati. Purisassa ca viññāṇasotaṃ pajānāti, ubhayato abbocchinnaṃ idha loke appatiṭṭhitañca paraloke appatiṭṭhitañca. Ayaṃ catutthā dassanasamāpatti. Etadānuttariyaṃ, bhante, dassanasamāpattīsu.
Puna caparaṃ, bhante, idhekacco samaṇo vā brāhmaṇo vā ātappamanvāya…pe… tathārūpaṃ cetosamādhiṃ phusati, yathāsamāhite citte imameva kāyaṃ uddhaṃ pādatalā adho kesamatthakā tacapariyantaṃ pūraṃ nānappakārassa asucino paccavekkhati – ‘atthi imasmiṃ kāye kesā lomā…pe… lasikā mutta’nti. Atikkamma ca purisassa chavimaṃsalohitaṃ aṭṭhiṃ paccavekkhati. Purisassa ca viññāṇasotaṃ pajānāti, ubhayato abbocchinnaṃ idha loke patiṭṭhitañca paraloke patiṭṭhitañca. Ayaṃ tatiyā dassanasamāpatti.
Nevertheless, instead of referring to a permanent, unbroken phenomena of consciousness (i.e., consciousness as a static thing or self), as critics of this term often charge, my understanding is that it's simply referring the flow of conscious events or experience, even when presented within the context of rebirth as traditionally understood in Theravada, which is described in terms of moments of consciousness arising and ceasing in rapid succession, with the last consciousness of a being at the time of death immediately conditions the arising of a new consciousness due to the presence of craving (tahna).
It should be noted, however, that the description of moments of consciousness arising and ceasing in rapid succession isn't explicitly found in the Suttas themselves. It's mainly found in the Abhidhamma Pitaka, as well as in post-canonical material like the Vimuttimagga and the Abhidhammattha Sangaha, and is closely associated with the theory of momentariness (khanavada). But the general principle is extrapolated from sources like AN 3.47:
Monks, these three are fabricated characteristics of what is fabricated. Which three? Arising is discernible, passing away is discernible, alteration (literally, other-ness) while staying is discernible.
Or, an alternate translation courtesy of Dhammanando Bhikkhu:
There are, bhikkhus, these three conditioned characteristics of the conditioned. Which three? Arising is manifest. Disappearance is manifest. The changing of what persists is manifest. These, bhikkhus, are the three conditioned characteristics of the conditioned.
Nm 2.4:
Life, personhood, pleasure and pain
- This is all that's bound together
In a single mental event
- A moment that quickly takes place.
Even for the devas who endure
For 84,000 thousand kalpas
- Even those do not live the same
For any two moments of the mind.
What ceases for one who is dead,
Or for one who's still standing here,
Are all just the same heaps
- Gone, never to connect again.
The states which are vanishing now,
And those which will vanish some day,
Have characteristics no different
Than those which have vanished before.
With no production there's no birth;
With "becoming" present, one exists.
When grasped with the highest meaning,
The world is dead when the mind stops.
There's no hoarding what has vanished,
No piling up for the future;
Those who have been born are standing
Like a seed upon a needle.
The vanishing of all these states
That have become is not welcome,
Though dissolving phenomena stand
Uncombined through primordial time.
From the unseen, things come and go.
Glimpsed only as they're passing by;
Like lightning flashing in the sky
- They arise and then pass away.
And probably even SN 12.61:
It would be better for the uninstructed run-of-the-mill person to hold to the body composed of the four great elements, rather than the mind, as the self. Why is that? Because this body composed of the four great elements is seen standing for a year, two years, three, four, five, ten, twenty, thirty, forty, fifty, a hundred years or more. But what's called 'mind,' 'intellect,' or 'consciousness' by day and by night arises as one thing and ceases as another. Just as a monkey, swinging through a forest wilderness, grabs a branch. Letting go of it, it grabs another branch. Letting go of that, it grabs another one.
From the Theravadin point of view, these mind-moments or moments of consciousness aren't seen as fixed or static entities but conditioned phenomena (i.e., they don't arise on their own or in a vacuum), which, due to the logical implications of anicca (inconstancy) and anatta (not-self), is a position Theravada is forced to reject. Hence, the idea of discrete phenomenal objects is replaced by the theory of momentariness, exchanging things for events, wherein one moment of consciousness arises, persists/changes and ceases in a complex, self-sustaining causal chain, with each event a result as well as a cause in that chain.
Moreover, if you admit the possibility of immaterial causes and not just material ones (assuming that a clear distinction between the two can even be made at a fundamental), then the continuation of said process isn't necessarily limited by or to a single material body. It's a theory of events that allows for continuity without the need for fixed and static elements or self, and is a natural outcome of deconstructing conscious experience into its constituent events.
In one essay, Bhikkhu Nanajivako presents some interesting comparisons between the Buddhist theory of anicca and modern philosophy, especially the similarities between the Buddhist theory of momentariness and some of things Bertrand Russell writes in An Outline of Philosophy:
Now, let us get a few quotations from Bertrand Russell. First, as regards substance-matter, he says:In former days, you could believe it on a philosophical ground that the soul is a substance and all substances are indestructible... But the notion of substance, in the sense of a permanent entity with changing states, is no longer applicable to the world.
A wave in the sea persists for a longer or shorter time: the waves that I see dashing themselves to pieces on the Cornish coast may have come all the way from Brazil, but that does not mean that a "thing" has traveled across the Atlantic; it means only that a certain process of change has traveled.
[Einstein's theory of relativity] has philosophical consequences which are, if possible, even more important. The substitution of space-time for space and time has made the category of substance less applicable than formerly, since the essence of substance was persistent through time, and there is now no one cosmic time.
We found that matter, in modern science, has lost its solidity and substantiality; it has become a mere ghost haunting the scenes of its former splendor... The notion of matter, in modern physics, has become absorbed into the notion of energy.
We cannot say that "matter is the cause of our sensations."... In a word, "matter" has become no more than a conventional shorthand for stating causal laws concerning events.
Thus we are committed to causation as an a priori belief without which we should have no reason for supposing that there is a "real" chair (or any thing) at all.
Next, as regards the theory of events, we note that the idea of fixed and static elements of "matter" has been replaced by that of undeterminable "events" corresponding to the quantum electrodynamic field theory in nuclear physics, which comes very close to the conception of a non-physical but purely phenomenological idea of dhammaa, implied in its primitive significance by kha.nika-vaado, or theory of momentariness, of the Abhidhamma-pi.takam. (This latter aspect, explicitly philosophical, will be sketched in Five, below.) Of this Russell writes:Everything in the world is composed of "events."... An "event" is something occupying a small finite amount of space-time... Events are not impenetrable, as matter is supposed to be; on the contrary, every event in space-time is overlapped by other events.
I assume that every event is contemporaneous with events that are not contemporaneous with each other; this is what is meant by saying that every event lasts for a finite time... Time is wholly relational.
Space-time order, as well as space-time points, results from the relations between events.
Compare with this last statement, and with those that follow, the assertion of Buddhaghosa in Atthasaalini: "By time the sage described the mind, and by mind described the time."
Lastly, Russell says of mental events:An important group of events, namely percepts, may be called "mental."
Mentality is an affair of causal laws, not of the quality of single events, and also, mentality is a matter of degree.
What is mind?... Mind must be a group of mental events, since we have rejected the view that it is a single simple entity such as the ego was formerly supposed to be... Its constitution corresponds however to "the unity of one 'experience.'"
As a result of these considerations, Russell concludes that "first of all, you must cut out the word 'I': the person who believes is an inference, not a part of what you know immediately."
In essence, moments of consciousness arising and passing away in succession simply implies that there's a type of continuity involved in conscious experience, nothing more. So when talking about a 'stream of consciousness,' it shouldn't be understood as a singular, discrete phenomenon, but a series of conditioned events that share a particular causal relationship. The same applies to terms like bhavangasota (stream of becoming), found in Snp 3.12, and samvattanikamvinnanam (evolving consciousness), found in MN 106. For example, from Piyadassi Thera's book, Dependent Origination:
In the Aneñjasappāya Sutta, the vipāka viññaṇa is referred to as saṃvattanikaṃ viññāṇaṃ, the consciousness that links on, that proceeds in one life as vipāka from the kamma in the former life.
When it is said, "the consciousness that links on," it does not mean that this consciousness abides unchanged, continues in the same state without perishing throughout this cycle of existence. Consciousness is also conditioned, and therefore is not permanent. Consciousness also comes into being and passes away yielding place to new consciousness. Thus this perpetual stream of consciousness goes on until existence ceases. Existence in a way is consciousness. In the absence of consciousness no “being” exists in this sentient world.
And besides Piyadassi Thera, who comes from a more traditional Theravada background, people like Prof. Gombrich, scholar of Pali and Sanskrit, founder of the Oxford Centre for Buddhist Studies and past president of the Pali Text Society, and Prof. Kalupahana, Buddhist scholar and professor philosophy at the University of Hawaii, are also aware of this term and express a similar understanding of it. For example, from Gombrich's What the Buddha Thought:
Famously, the Buddha's approach to life's problems was pragmatic. Our problems are urgent, and irrelevant theorizing is a silly as refusing to receive treatment for an arrow wound until you know the name of the man who shot the arrow. Today we see the world as in perpetual motion, and that reminds people of the Buddhist principle of impermanence. True, the Buddha saw our experience as an ever-changing process, a stream of consciousness — the literal Pali equivalent of that expression does occur. But we are talking physics, whereas the Buddha was talking psychology. (67)
And from Kalupahana's Buddhist Philosophy, A Historical Analysis:
All this is evidence that it is consciousness that serves as a connecting link between two lives, and this, of course is unequivocally stated in the early Buddhist texts. Several times it is mentioned that a person who has developed extrasensory perception is able "to perceive a man's unbroken flux of consciousness established both in this world and in the next." This stream of consciousness (vinnanasota) is the same as the stream of becoming (bhavasota) mentioned often in the early discourses.
It is important to note that in the early texts there is no mention of this consciousness surviving even for a moment without the support of a psychophysical personality. In other words, early Buddhism does not contribute to a theory of disembodied existence. (52)
Another controversial yet semi-related concept found in both Mahayana and Theravada is the idea of a subconsciousness and/or storehouse consciousness. While technically a type of mind consciousness (mano-vinnana), this particular aspect of consciousness is often presented separately, and mainly posited to account for the times when active consciousness lapses, e.g., during deep sleep.
This type of consciousness, called bhavanga-citta in Theravada and alaya-vijnana in Mahayana, is often used to account for the continuity of individuals, especially over multiple lifetimes. In one essay, Walpola Rahula attempts to show that the three layers of mind as presented by Asanga have their origins in the Pali Canon:
Thus we can see that vijnana represents the simple reaction or response of the sense-organs when they come in contact with external objects. This is the uppermost or superficial aspect or layer of the vijnanaskandha. Manas represents the aspect of its mental functioning, thinking, reasoning, conceiving ideas, etc. Citta, which is here called alayavijnana, represents the deepest, finest and subtlest aspect or layer of the Aggregate of Consciousness. It contains all the traces or impressions of the past actions and all good and bad future potentialities. The Sandhinirmocana-sutra also says that alayavijnana is called citta (Tibetan sems).
It is generally believed that alayavijnana is purely a Mahayana doctrine and that nothing about it is found in Hinayana. But in the Mahayanasangraha, Asanga himself says that in the Sravakayana (= Hinayana) it is mentioned by synonyms (paryaya) and refers to a passage in the Ekottaragama which reads: 'People (praja) like the alaya (alayarata), are fond of the alaya (alayarama), are delighted in the alaya (alayasammudita), are attached to the alaya (alayabhirata). When the Dharma is preached for the destruction of the alaya, they wish to listen (susrusanti) and lend their ears (srotram avadadhanti), they put forth a will for the perfect knowledge (ajnacittam upasthapayanti) and follow the path of Truth (dharmanudharma-pratipanna). When the Tathagata appears in the world (pradurbhava), this marvellous (ascarya) and extraordinary (adbhuta) Dharma appears in the world.'
Lamotte identifies this Ekottaragama passage with the following passage in the Pali Anguttaranikaya (A II, p.131): Alayarama bhikkhave paja alayarata alayasammudita, sa Tathagatena analaye dhamme desiyamane sussuyati sotam odahati annacittam upattapeti. Tathagatassa bhikkhave arahato sammasambuddhassa patubhava ayam pathamo acchariyo abbhuto dhammo patubhavati.
Of course, the majority of the above should be understood as much later elaborations based on terms and ideas found within the early discourses, and shouldn't simply be accepted as reflecting the Buddha's teachings in the early discourses themselves. It's always good to challenge these ideas and see if there are areas where they conflict with the Suttas and with our own experience. That's the approach the Buddha himself advises in places like AN 3.65 and MN 38, with passages like:
"Bhikkhus, you who know thus and see thus, would you say: 'We have reverence for the Teacher. We say it out of reverence to the Teacher'?" "No, venerable sir." "Bhikkhus, you who know thus and see thus, would you say: 'Our recluse said it, these are the recluse’s words. But we do not say that'?" "No, venerable sir." "Bhikkhus, you who know thus and see thus, would you acknowledge another teacher?" "No, venerable sir." "Bhikkhus, you who know thus and see thus, would you seek meaning in religious rites, ceremonies or festivals of other recluses and brahmins?" "No, venerable sir." "Bhikkhus, is it that you yourself knowing, seeing and experiencing this speak thus?" "Yes, venerable sir."
"Good, O, Bhikkhus, I have led you in this Dhamma which is visible here and now, timeless, open to inspection, leading onwards and to be experienced by the wise for themselves. It was in reference to this that it was said: 'Bhikkhus, this Dhamma is visible here and now, timeless, open to inspection, leading onwards and to be experienced by the wise for themselves'."
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