unanswered questions

How was the world created? Where did we come from? What is the nature of the universe? Is there a God? These are seemingly timeless questions, questions which most religions attempt to answer, even Buddhism to a certain extent it would seem. There does appears to be a type of creation myth in the Agganna Sutta of the Digha Nikaya, after all. Nevertheless, many people new to Buddhism may be surprised to hear that these questions are really a non-issue in Buddhism, especially in regard to the practice itself. In fact, the Buddha leaves most of them unanswered, and the ones he does answer, it's not always how we expect.

Take MN 63, for example. In this exchange, Malunkaputta demands that the Buddha answer ten questions concerning positions that are "undeclared, set aside, discarded by the Blessed One" — whether the cosmos is eternal or not eternal; whether the cosmos is finite or infinite; whether the soul and the body are the same or the soul is one thing and the body another; whether after death a Tathagata exists or does not exist, both exists and does not exist or neither exists nor does not exist — or else he will leave the Sangha.

The Buddha responds to this onslaught of questions by asking Malunkyaputta, "Did I ever say to you, 'Come, Malunkyaputta, live the holy life under me, and I will declare to you that 'The cosmos is eternal,' or 'The cosmos is not eternal,' or 'The cosmos is finite,' or 'The cosmos is infinite,' or 'The soul & the body are the same,' or 'The soul is one thing and the body another,' or 'After death a Tathagata exists,' or 'After death a Tathagata does not exist,' or 'After death a Tathagata both exists & does not exist,' or 'After death a Tathagata neither exists nor does not exist?'" Malunkaputta, of course, answers no. The Buddha further admonishes:

Malunkyaputta, if anyone were to say, 'I won't live the holy life under the Blessed One as long as he does not declare to me that "The cosmos is eternal,"... or that "After death a Tathagata neither exists nor does not exist,"' the man would die and those things would still remain undeclared by the Tathagata.

As for DN 27, the Buddha tells a story about the beginning of life on this world to two brahmins which, in the end, was used to illustrate how the way to liberation is beyond caste and lineage. So, in this regard, the Buddha does give what can be interpreted as a rough theory of evolution to the pair of brahmins in that the physical characteristics of the mythological beings in question change due to environmental changes and interactions, as well as a description the universe somewhat akin to the oscillating universe theory.

I think that, when taken literally, the creation myth in DN 27 can be seen as an attempt to give a naturalistic explanation of the origins of life and the universe, and Darwin's fairly well-proven theory of evolution certainly isn't inconsistent with this, which makes many new Buddhists breath a sigh of relief. That being said, I agree with Prof. Gombrich that, taking the context of DN 27 into account, this sutta is a lively and ingenious parody that's actually meant to make fun of the very need for a cosmology as a foundation for religious development (How Buddhism Began: The Conditioned Genesis of the Early Teachings, pg. 81-82).

Personally, I see Buddhism as dealing exclusively with mental stress and its cessation (i.e., psychology), not biology, or physics, etc. And while some people get excited when they discover that Buddhism contains teachings which seem to be in accord with modern science, I think they can often be misleading and shouldn't be taken too seriously, or at least, too literally. I think this is especially true of DN 27 considering that recent observations of cosmic background radiation indicate the universe is actually expanding at an accelerated rate, hence there may not be any contraction or 'Big Crunch.' (Lawrence Krauss mentions this in his talk at the 2009 AAI Conference; although it should also be noted that Roger Penrose recently challenged the commonly-held 'inflationary theory' of cosmology with his suggestion that analysis of cosmic microwave background shows echoes of previous Big Bang-like events.)

As for the question of God, that's also a non-issue in Buddhism. According to the texts, a beginning point to samsara (literally 'wandering on') isn't evident (SN 15.3). This can be interpreted two ways — that a beginning point to the continual cycle of death and rebirth of beings isn't evident, or that a beginning point to the continual cycle of death and rebirth of the conceit 'I am,' the self-identification that designates a being (satta), isn't evident — and they're not mutually exclusive. Either way, the point is the same: all that really matters in the here and now is whether suffering is present, and if so, how it can be overcome.

All in all, I think it's safe to say that Buddhism is essentially non-theistic in view. However, I also happen to be of the opinion that, if we dig a bit deeper, the idea of a creator God is incompatible with certain aspects and teachings that, if taken to their logical conclusion, seem to reject the idea of, or a need for, a creator God. For one thing, the logic of dependent co-arising negates the idea of a creator God in that it precludes a first cause or a causeless cause. Then there's this famous problem of evil passage from the Bhuridatta Jataka (although, to be fair, this is most likely a later addition that some date to the 13th century):

We see those rules enforced before our eyes,
None but the Brahmans offer sacrifice,
None but the Khattiya exercises sway,
The Vessas plough, the Suddas must obey.
These greedy liars propagate deceit,
And fools believe the fictions they repeat;
He who has eyes can see the sickening sight;
Why does not Brahma set his creatures right?
If his wide power no limits can restrain,
Why is his hand so rarely spread to bless?
Why are his creatures all condemned to pain?
Why does he not to all give happiness?

Why do fraud, lies, and ignorance prevail?
Why triumphs falsehood, truth and justice fail?
I count your Brahma one of the unjust among,
Who made a world in which to shelter wrong.
Those men are counted pure who only kill
Frogs, worms, bees, snakes or insects as they will,
These are your savage customs which I hate,
Such as Kamboja hordes might emulate.
If he who kills is counted innocent
And if the victim safe to heaven is sent,
Let Brahmans Brahmans kill so all were well
And those who listen to the words they tell.

At best, God would have be more like the impassive and impersonal God of Aristotle, existing outside of time and space, to find a place within Buddhist cosmology. Nevertheless, even in the earliest parts of the Pali Canon, there are references to devas or what we might call 'heavenly beings.' However, devas (literally 'radiant ones'), which are often seen as gods when taken literally, are simply non-human beings who are more powerful and long-lived than ordinary humans, and are by no means eternal, omnipresent, omnipotent, etc. But more importantly, they can also be viewed metaphorically as the indulgent and hedonistic aspects of our psychology (i.e., the parts that are addicted to sensual pleasures).

In addition, according to AN 3.61, the belief in a supreme being can be unskillful and interfere with Dhamma practice if it leads to the belief that everything a person experiences is due to such a supreme being, a denial of the efficacy of kamma (literally 'action') and a life of inaction:

Having approached the priests & contemplatives who hold that... 'Whatever a person experiences... is all caused by a supreme being's act of creation,' I said to them: 'Is it true that you hold that... "Whatever a person experiences... is all caused by a supreme being's act of creation?"' Thus asked by me, they admitted, 'Yes.' Then I said to them, 'Then in that case, a person is a killer of living beings because of a supreme being's act of creation. A person is a thief... unchaste... a liar... a divisive speaker... a harsh speaker... an idle chatterer... greedy... malicious... a holder of wrong views because of a supreme being's act of creation.' When one falls back on creation by a supreme being as being essential, monks, there is no desire, no effort [at the thought], 'This should be done. This shouldn't be done.' When one can't pin down as a truth or reality what should & shouldn't be done, one dwells bewildered & unprotected. One cannot righteously refer to oneself as a contemplative. This was my second righteous refutation of those priests & contemplatives who hold to such teachings, such views.

Furthermore, in relation to the four noble truths and the practice of the noble eightfold path, the matter of the existence of God is irrelevant and, soteriologically speaking, a distraction to be avoided. Of course, this doesn't mean that people can't believe in God and still practice the Dhamma, especially some of its more contemplative aspects, but it does mean that, at the very least, such views can negatively impact the practice when held inappropriately.

In my opinion, Buddhism has always been what we might call a type of 'transcendent psychology,' and it's only been relatively recently (at least in the West) that its more technical terms have been understood and translated in ways that make this clear. I think this shift is due in no small part to the decades of excellent scholarship that's been brought to bear on the texts and the religious-historical context in which they took shape. As I mentioned all the way back in my first post, regardless of how it's been popularized, at its core, Buddhism deals exclusively with one subject, that of human mental suffering. The Buddha himself made it clear that:

Both formerly and now, monks, I declare only stress and the cessation of stress.

That's not to say there aren't 'supernatural' concepts in Buddhism, or that local customs, deities and religious practices haven't found their way into Buddhism wherever it's been established. But rather than a pure system of thought or a strictly faith-based worship of the supernatural, a critical analysis of the earliest texts reveals a much more pragmatic and specialized method of mental training than most traditional Buddhists and Western converts realize—one that seeks to diminish and even eliminate suffering by radically changing the way the mind relates to experience.

Whatever else this radical transformation may open one up to, I can't say, but I suspect that Thanissaro Bhikkhu's right when he says that we're "not committing spiritual suicide." The allegory of the cave in Plato's Republic immediately comes to mind here, where he uses the image of the philosopher turning the soul (mind) away from the darkness of the visible realm (samsara) towards the light of the form of the Good (nibbana). So, from this perspective, being an atheist, or even a theist for that matter, doesn't preclude one from practicing Buddhism so long as one has an open mind and is willing to at least give some of these teachings a chance.

sexual misconduct

The five precepts are the basic training rules all Buddhists are encouraged to observe to the best of their ability. They constitute the basic level of virtue the Buddha advises is necessary for the peace of mind conducive to a successful practice, especially in regard to meditation, and they are seen as gifts "that are not open to suspicion, will never be open to suspicion, and are unfaulted by knowledgeable contemplatives & priests" (AN 8.39). While most of them are fairly straightforward, the third needs a bit more explanation seeing as it's somewhat vague.

To begin with, it should be made clear that the precepts aren't equivalent to commandments in that they're training rules that are voluntarily undertaken rather than edicts or commands dictated by a higher power and/or authority. In essence, these precepts are undertaken to protect oneself, as well as others, from the results of unskillful actions. Actions are considered unskillful when they arise out of the mental defilements of greed, hatred, and delusion and lead to self-affliction, to the affliction of others, or to both (MN 61).

In regard to Buddhist sexual ethics, the third precept states: "I undertake the precept to refrain from sexual misconduct." This, of course, will naturally lead one to the question, What is the definition of sexual misconduct? To answer that question, however, we must take into account the other four precepts. The five precepts are an integrated whole, and each precept helps to support the others. The other four precepts are (1) to refrain from harming living beings, (2) to refrain from taking what's not given, (3) to refrain from false speech, and (4) to refrain from taking intoxicants that lead to carelessness.

Therefore, generally speaking, we can say that sexual misconduct consists of any sexual conduct that involves violence, manipulation, and/or deceit, and it specifically includes sex with "those who are protected by their mothers, their fathers, their brothers, their sisters, their relatives, or their Dhamma [i.e., monastics who have taken vows of celibacy]; those with husbands [or wives], those who entail punishments [i.e., those protected by law, such as if they're underage], or even those crowned with flowers by another man [i.e., engaged]" (MN 41). As the Ven. S. Dhammika elaborates:

If we use trickery, emotional blackmail or force to compel someone to have sex with us, then this is sexual misconduct. Adultery is also a form of sexual misconduct because when we marry we promise our spouse that we will be loyal to them. When we commit adultery we break that promise and betray that trust. Sex should be an expression of love and intimacy between two people and when it is it contributes to our mental and emotional well-being.

So, to summarize, from what I've been taught by my teachers, as well as from what I've read in the suttas, sexual misconduct includes any sexual activity that leads to self-affliction, to the affliction of others, or to both, or that involves any person who's already in a committed relationship (e.g., engaged, married, etc.), protected by law (e.g., under age, etc.), or under religious vows entailing celibacy (e.g., monks, nuns, etc.). Hence in Theravada, sex between consenting persons of legal age who aren't already in committed relationships and haven't taken vows of celibacy isn't considered misconduct.

In regard to anal and oral sex, there's a prohibition against sex concerning "inappropriate orifices" (i.e. anal and oral) that can be found in Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakosabhasyam, as well as a few other Sarvastivadin texts, but there's no such prohibition found in any Theravadin source. The same goes for masturbation. These were most likely introduced by later commentators such as Vasubandhu.

Personally, I think that a lot of the views concerning marriage and sex are influenced more by cultural, religious and social norms than by any universal constant. And regardless of what any tradition of Buddhism has to say about, I don't think there's anything inherently wrong with sex or masturbation; although I do think that strong sexual desires can cause discomfort in the mind when in deep states of concentration, and can actually make it difficult to develop more refined states of mind in the first place.

desire

People new to Buddhism often conflate desire (chandha) and craving (tahna), and this is partially the fault of translators, but desire and craving are actually two different but closely related aspects of our psychology. Desire is a neutral term, and one generally has to have the desire to achieve a goal in order to achieve it, even nibbana (SN 51.15); whereas the Pali word for craving, tahna (literally 'thirst'), is something that's directly tied to suffering.

The second noble truth states that the origination of suffering is "the craving that makes for further becoming — accompanied by passion & delight, relishing now here & now there — i.e., craving for sensual pleasure, craving for becoming, craving for non-becoming" (SN 56.11). As Thanissaro Bhikkhu explains in Wings to Awakening:

Craving for sensuality, here, means the desire for sensual objects. Craving for becoming means the desire for the formation of states or realms of being that are not currently happening, while craving for non-becoming means the desire for the destruction or halting of any that are. "Passion and delight," here, is apparently a synonym for the "desire and passion" for the five aggregates that constitutes clinging/sustenance [III/H/ii].

Desire, on the other hand, can be skillful (kusala) or unskillful (akusala) depending on the context. The desire for happiness, especially long-term welfare and happiness, is actually an important part of the Buddhist path. Moreover, desire is listed as one of the four bases of power (iddhipada), which themselves are included in the seven sets of qualities that lead to the end of suffering (MN 103). The four qualities listed in the bases of power are desire, persistence, intent and discrimination. In Wings to Awakening, Thanissaro Bhikkhu points to this passage:

There is the case where a monk develops the base of power endowed with concentration founded on desire & the fabrications of exertion, thinking, 'This desire of mine will be neither overly sluggish nor overly active, neither inwardly restricted nor outwardly scattered.' (Similarly with concentration founded on persistence, intent, and discrimination.)

He goes on to explain that, "This passage shows that the problem lies not in the desire, effort, intent or discrimination, but in the fact that these qualities can be unskillfully applied or improperly tuned to their task." If we take a look at the exchange between Ananda and the brahmin Unnabha in SN 51.15, for example, we can see that the attainment of the goal is indeed achieved through desire, even though paradoxically, the goal is said to be the abandoning of desire. That's because at the end of the path desire, as well as the other three bases of power, subside on their own. As Ananda explains at the end of SN 51.15:

He earlier had the desire for the attainment of arahantship, and when he attained arahantship, the corresponding desire subsided. He earlier had aroused energy for the attainment of arahantship, and when he attained arahantship, the corresponding energy subsided. He earlier had made up his mind to attain arahantship, and when he attained arahantship, the corresponding resolution subsided. He earlier had made an investigation for the attainment of arahantship, and when he attained arahantship, the corresponding investigation subsided. (Bodhi)

So, in essence, desire can be beneficial in certain contexts, and one shouldn't be worried about the desire to do skillful things. Craving, on the other hand, is something that, by its very nature, conditions suffering through the way it encourages the mind to feed upon sensory experiences and either causes it to intensely cling to pleasant experiences or violently push away unpleasant ones. It may have helped us at some point in our evolution, but now it tends to do more harm than good.