buddhism: ontology or process philosophy?

From my reading of the Pali Canon, it seems to me that the Buddha's teachings generally tend to avoid metaphysics, including ontology, in favour of a pragmatic approach to understanding mental stress and suffering (dukkha) and removing its causes (e.g., see MN 63). If anything, I'd say Buddhism is closer to something like process philosophy in Western philosophical terminology, where the focus is on processes or becoming rather than unchanging being or essence, e.g., Heraclitus vs. Plato; anicca + anatta vs. atman; or anything else that looks at change vs. essence.

Essentially (for those less familiar with these concepts), if something is impermanent, it means that it's subject to change, whereas that which has a permanent being or essence isn't. In other words, becoming (or any process of change) is only possible within the context of impermanence. In the examples I gave above, the former are examples of things dealing with processes or becoming, while the latter are things dealing with unchanging being or essence.

For example, Heraclitus, if we're to believe Plato, is famous for his idea that "everything flows," whereas Plato is famous for his idea of eternal forms. In the second example, the Buddha taught that what we mistakenly cling to as 'self' is really only impermanent phenomena subject to arising, changing, and passing away, whereas the Vedas and Upanishads are general understood to teach that our self is something real and eternal, something that is.

So strict ontology deals more with what inherently is or exists from its own side (i.e., being or essence), whereas the basic idea behind process philosophy is that what 'exists' is best understood in terms of processes rather than things or substances, and that change — whether physical, organic or psychological — "is the pervasive and predominant feature of the real." As such, it's sometimes called 'ontology of becoming.'

Of course, in Buddhism, becoming (bhava) refers more to the sense of identity that arises when there's clinging to one or more of the aggregates, but the basic idea is that our sense of self is a process of 'I-making' and 'my-making,' which I think can be classified as a type of process philosophy. The only area of metaphysics the Buddha does engage in is causality; but even here, he doesn't offer proofs so much as suggests that adopting these views in a pragmatic, common sense manner is empirically useful in the quest to end suffering. Hence, Buddhism avoids many of the metaphysical quandaries, including questions of ontology, that seem to plague other philosophical/religious traditions.

a new perspective on the middle way?

Most people know Buddhism as the middle way between the two extremes of self-mortification and self-indulgence, but I think David Kalupahana offers an interesting perspective when he concludes in A History of Buddhist Philosophy that:

"Whereas Sanjaya [a skeptic and original teacher of Sariputta and Maha-Mogallana] was reluctant to make any positive pronouncements through fear of falling into error, the Buddha was willing to recognize the limitations of human knowledge and provide a reasonable description of truth and reality without reaching out for ultimate objectivity. This approach allowed him to avoid any ontological or metaphysical commitments and deal with language in a more meaningful way. For these reasons, he refrained from either raising or answering questions relating to ultimate origins or destinies, questions that had haunted Indian philosophers for centuries...
"If Absolutism is the result of reaching out for ultimate objectivity in philosophical discourse, and if extreme skepticism is the reason for the failure of such an enterprise, the Buddha, in his explanation of human experience, seems to have renounced the search for such objectivity and confined himself to a middle way, thereby renouncing both Absolutism and extreme skepticism." (21)

This idea is explained in more detail later on when he discusses (1) sense experiences and (2) yogic experiences:

"Fourth, his realization that ultimate regarding the object itself cannot be achieved and that the human perspective is unavoidable is underscored by his statement regarding the initial stage of sense experience, that is to say, "depending upon the visual organ and the visible object arises visual consciousness." Where can a philosopher go to determine the nature of the object while avoiding the consciousness of the object? If consciousness is not a tabula rasa but part of the psychophysical personality and hence conditioned by previous experiences, there are many other elements that will enter the scene when a decision is made regarding the object. It is to explain the complex nature of consciousness, while at the same time allowing for the retention of some measure of objectivity of the object, that the Buddha underscores the dependence of consciousness on the sense organ and the object. Furthermore, there is no suggestion of epi-phenomenalism, that is, that consciousness is a byproduct of matter, and therefore generated at each moment as a result of the contact between the sense and the object." (33)

"This is an extremely important reflection [referring to the passage in DN 2 concerning "insight knowledge"], following immediately after the fourth preliminary stage of contemplation (jhana), which, as mentioned earlier, has been wrongly interpreted as a state where all discursive and initial thought are abandoned. It is an unequivocal statement that some of the so-called higher forms of knowledge pertain to the nature of the physical body, the inalienable part of the human personality. It refers not only to the source and nature of the physical personality but also to the fact that there is consciousness associated with it, which makes it a complete person.
"Against the background of the theories of the six heterodox teachers referred to in Chapter 1, this description of the human person is significant. While the heterodox teachers attempted to provide an objective explanation of the human personality by focusing on either the physical body or physical actions, which they felt to be easily and objectively identifiable, the Buddha here introduced consciousness as an inalienable part of the human personality, even though it is not so objectively identified and analyzed. Thus he rejected the purely physical explanation of human personality as well as human behavior." (39)

And regarding the five higher knowledges (psychokinesis, clairaudience, telepathy, retrocognition and clairvoyance):

"The fifth higher knowledge is clairvoyance (dibbacakkhu). As defined by the Buddha, it does not involve knowledge of the future. While clairvoyance is sometimes used in the sense of perceiving events taking place at a distance, and is comparable to clairaudience, more often it refers to knowledge of the evolution of other human beings as they are conditioned by their karma. The recognition of such a form of knowledge appears to be extremely arbitrary on the par of anyone claiming to be an empiricist. The question is often raised as to how an empiricist can explain knowledge of other-minds, let alone their evolution through several existences. It seems that doubts about the existence of other-minds are generated more by philosophers who attempt to reach ultimate objectivity in their explanations. In the Indian context, the Materialists, the Ajivikas, and even the Jainas seem to have been confronted with such problems. In the case of the Buddha, the issue was to a great extent dissolved by his adoption of a philosophical standpoint the simply avoids generating such problems. When subsequent Buddhist philosophers adopted such objective standpoints, they were compelled to compile treatises justifying the existence of other-minds, as exemplified by Vinitadeva's Santanantarasiddhi (Establishment of Other-minds).
"It is possible to adopt two extreme attitudes about the five forms of knowledge referred to above. The skeptic who looks for an objective explanation can insist on the meaninglessness of such knowledge-claims, for they are not compatible with his notion of verifiability, which is confined mostly to the physical. The spiritualist, in contrast, believes that such knowledge is mystical and has nothing to do with ordinary experiences. The middle path adopted by the Buddha avoids both these extremes. Without being unduly skeptical or excessively enamored with them, he was willing to accept whatever information was available through such means as long as it possessed any pragmatic value. Karma and rebirth, two doctrines that the Buddha came to accept on the basis of some of these experiences, were justified not only on empirical grounds but also on pragmatic ones, the latter being highlighted for the benefit of the skeptic." (41-2)

In essence, Kalupahana seems to be making an interesting case for Buddhism being a middle way between Absolutism and extreme skepticism, as well as between the more well-known extremes of sever asceticism/self-mortification and excessive self-indulgence.

some rambling thoughts on nietzsche's ego and will to power, part 2

There was an interesting discussion on freeratio.org about culturally conditioned morality, particularly religiously influenced ideas such as the Buddhist concept of kamma, and being completely free of their oppressive weight. The OP commented, "Imagine how freeing it would be to know that we could intentionally harm another without any interpretations of right and wrong at all, just because we felt like it." They qualified this statement with, "I'm not saying that I want to do that, but I have seen those that do, and who seem to feel no restraints of a metaphysical nature, or indeed any nature, upon them. Indeed it can be a somewhat joyous process to witness," and then invoked the name of Nietzsche.

Personally, I've always found the concept of kamma (literally 'action') to be quite pragmatic, and not terribly heavy at all. The way I see it, we simply experience the results of our intentional actions in ways that are interpreted to be right or wrong based upon a myriad of factors, some of which may be unique to our species (i.e., kamma is psychological in nature); and we become free of kamma once we get ourselves to the point where we'll never intentional harm another, nor ourselves, and free our mind of clinging (to sensual pleasures, views, rites and rituals, and doctrines of self).

The way they described this freedom from moral conventions, however, immediately reminded me of a psychopath, and I found the thought of purposefully wanting to become like that quite frightening. While I agree that it sounds freeing to a certain extent, even if all psychological restraints are removed from the individual, there are still societal consequences involved in harming others that aren't what I'd describe as 'freeing' or 'joyous.' Moreover, this kind of freedom sounds more appropriate in the Wild West than a modern, civilized society. I suppose this is one of the reasons I've never been a big fan of Nietzsche or Rand, whose philosophies I find somewhat similar in that they seem to exhibit strong psychopathic elements/influences.

In fact, as I've said before, I'd even go so far as to say that Nietzsche's philosophy and type of ego-development leads to an unhealthy type of individual who 'transcends' the world in order to lord over it (a hero who's the antithesis of Buddhism's spiritual egalitarianism). For example, in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, he calls the 'lust to rule' a "gift-giving virtue"; proclaims that selfishness is blessed, wholesome and healthy; and suggests suffering can be drowned out by continuously creating and overcoming oneself; in The Dawn, he writes, "The striving for excellence is the striving to overwhelm one's neighbor, even if only very indirectly or only in one's own feelings or even dreams"; etc. (Compare the last line to this entry from one of Rand's personal journals: "One puts oneself above all and crushes everything in one's way to get the best for oneself. Fine!")

I think this issue arises mainly from his unbalanced view of morality, i.e., his focus on the 'strong-willed individual' and his rejection of what he calls 'slave morality,' which values actions according to their good or evil (i.e., skillful or unskillful) intentions, for 'master-morality,' which values actions according to their good or bad (i.e., pleasant or painful) consequences. This view is unbalanced in that it either overlooks, or completely denies, the efficacy of the intentions underlying our actions (not to mention its blatant disregard for others) (whereas Buddhist concept of kamma recognizes both actions and their intentions as contributing to the experience of mental well-being and/or suffering, for ourselves as well as others).

Nietzsche was undoubtedly a great and original thinker, Rand a little bit less so, in my opinion; nevertheless, I find in his writings evidence that he was also somewhat of a self-absorbed individual with little-to-no conscience or empathy for others, and for whom social rules and conventions had little-to-no meaning, which may have been one of the reasons he seemed so keen on subverting them. At least, that's the impression I get from what little of Nietzsche I've read. The same applies to Rand; maybe even more so since she seems to have admired a likely psychopath named William Hickman, going so far as to model a character named Danny Renahan on him for a novel that was never finished. In one journal entry, for example, she writes of Renahan (emphasis hers):

He is born with a wonderful, free, light consciousness—[resulting from] the absolute lack of social instinct or herd feeling. He does not understand, because he has no organ for understanding, the necessity, meaning, or importance of other people. (One instance when it is blessed not to have an organ of understanding. Other people do not exist for him and he does not understand why they should. He knows himself—and that is enough. Other people have no right, no hold, no interest or influence on him. And this is not affect or chosen—it's inborn, absolute, it can't be changed, he has "no organ" to be otherwise. In this respect, he has the true, innate psychology of a Superman. He can never realize and feel "other people."

Of course, some might say that this is a crude misunderstanding of Nietzsche's Ubermensch, and that he most certainly doesn't advocate psychopathy—that he simply acknowledges the 'will-to-power' is inherently sadistic, and his program is to turn that inward in an effort to transcend and overcome various social conditionings, becoming as one wills and not otherwise. And while I'm sympathetic to that view, I believe that his ideas are essentially the perfect ethical foundation/justification for a psychopath when taken to their logical conclusion, and Rand's more explicitly so. At the very least, I find them to be self-indulgent in the extreme as they seem to completely neglect others except as stepping stones. If their idea of joy is reveling in one's power and freedom to the exclusion, even detriment, of others, then it's a kind of joy and freedom I can live without.