In Theravada, a sammasambuddha (perfectly enlightened buddha) is understood to be a person who achieves perfect enlightenment without having heard the Dhamma from others, and is able to effectively teach it to others. Once their natural lifespan is over (which, according to DN 16, a buddha can extend if asked), they pass away and attain total unbinding (parinibbana), a freedom that's characterized by the complete cessation of the five aggregates (khandha).
In Mahayana, however, a buddha isn't just one who achieves perfect enlightenment and teaches the Dhamma to others, but, according to the Mahaparinirvana Sutra and certain Tathagatagarbha sutras, one who also possesses purified (i.e., eternal and unchanging) aggregates that are incomprehensible the unawakened.
As such, from the Mahayana point of view, there's nothing stopping a buddha from 'popping back' into samsara (the cycle of death and rebirth), especially considering that, for them, the distinction between samsara and nirvana is little more than an illusion when viewed from the ultimate standpoint of the dharmakaya or 'truth-body.' Moreover, their conception of causality allows for the continuation of the mindstream after the breakup of the body. As Namdrol from E-Sangha once explained it to me:
If the causes if a mindstream were solely afflictive, then with the exhaustion of the karmic share that sustains the life force of the body, and thus the life of a Buddha or an arhat, I might be inclined to agree that the mind stream of a Buddha or an arhat would cease at death, since all causes for its continuance would be exhausted too. However there is a slight problem with this: if the mindstream's causes were solely afflictive, why does the mind not cease with nirvana in toto? Why does the mind continue after the eradication of all afflictions in a Buddha and an arhat? And if the mind continues after the eradication of the afflictions of a Buddha, etc., why could it not continue after the breakup of the body of a Buddha, etc., albeit in a non-afflicted state? In fact, Peter Harvey's interesting book, The Selfless Mind, makes this very suggestion on page 250 where he summerizes all of his arguments and findings.
In other words, not only does bodhicitta act as a cause to help keep the bodhisattva on the path to buddhahood throughout their innumerable lifetimes, it acts as a positive, non-afflictive cause for the continuation of the enlightened being/mindstream as well. And this is perfectly logical and consistent within Mahayana's own understanding of itself, which includes certain terms that Theravada understands differently.
For example, the Theravada standpoint is that the cause of said mindstream (as well as the body) is kamma (literally 'action'), both skillful and unskillful, although I'm not entirely sure if this corresponds to afflictive and non-afflictive in Mahayana. Nevertheless, in the Pali Canon, the noble eightfold path is said to be the kamma that leads to the ending of kamma (AN 4.235).
When it comes to the standard explanation of why the mind and body don't [always] cease with that attainment of nirvana, it's said that as long as the lifespan of the aggregates isn't completely exhausted — which itself depends upon the amount of input remaining from past kamma — the mind and body of an arahant (noble one) will continue. When this input from past kamma is exhausted, there's said to be complete cessation of both mind and body.
A Mahayanist, on the other hand, would probably disagree with this in an ultimate sense, saying that this is only how it appears from the point of view of samsara (think relativity here), but not from the point of view of high-level Bodhisattvas and fully enlightened Buddhas.
Another main difference is Mahayana's understanding of nirvana, which is also understood differently in Mahayana. In Mahayana, those who have attained nirvana still have work to do. This idea originates from certain Mahayana texts such as the Saddharmapundarika Sutra, where the arahant is said not to have reached final nirvana. Essentially, they're seen as being intoxicated with the bliss of the samadhi of cessation, not the nirvana that's attained by a fully enlightened buddha.
Moreover, it's said that buddhas are then able to awaken these individuals from their temporary cessation in order for them to continue towards complete buddhahood (making buddhas extremely important), which is characterized by omniscience. This is said to be due to buddhahood being the result of wisdom and merit accumulation, and not just the eradication of afflictions (which isn't too different from Theravada sans the awakening of arahants bit). As Thubten Chodron explains it:
In the Sanskrit canon, or at least in the Tibetan tradition, when you have arhatship without remainder you abide in meditative equipoise on emptiness for a long, long time. So consciousness still exists, the person still exists, it's merely labeled in dependence upon those aggregates, which are not tainted aggregates, but not completely purified aggregates. Although they're free from ignorance, so they're untainted. Yes, they would be untainted. They still have the cognitive obscurations but they would be untainted. So you abide in the nirvana for eons in your meditative equipoise until eventually the Buddha wakes you up and says, “You have to work for the benefit of sentient beings, your job isn't really done.” So that's from a Mahayana viewpoint, what's happened to the arhats.
The nature of Shakyamuni in Mahayana is a bit more complicated as well. For one thing, Mahayana isn't homogeneous in a number of areas; but in general, the historical Buddha is seen to be a nirmanakaya (created-body), i.e., a manifestation of the dharmakaya who appears for the benefit of sentient beings.
Of course, all of this contrasts with how the Buddha and nirvana are presented and understood in Theravada, which is why these inter-tradition dialogues often end with everyone talking past each other. Whether or not one agrees with all of this is irrelevant, however, since neither tradition is the arbiter of all things Buddhist. The best we can do is agree to disagree. To steal a phrase from tiltbillings, "The Mahayana does not get to define the Theravada for Theravadins any more than the Theravada gets to define the Mahayana for Mahayanists."
I'm not saying that one can't be critical of certain ideas or have inter-tradition debates, only that nobody can really 'win' such debates when each side is logically consistent within itself, and it all depends on what one takes as the basis for their views. It's entirely possible, for example, that a person who accepts the commentarial literature in Theravada as authoritative can have serious disagreements with someone who only accepts the Suttas, so just imagine the amount of disagreement possible with someone who accepts an additional collection of teachings that lies outside of Theravada altogether.
This is why I often try to look beyond these debates and focus instead on other criteria for choosing what to accept as the basis for my views, things such as archeology, scholarly opinion, textual analysis, etc. I'm just as liable to reject the majority of the Theravadin commentarial literature as I am the majority of Sanskrit sutras. Don't get me wrong, though. That doesn't mean I don't find things in each I like, admire or even adopt when I think they're beneficial; and it certainly doesn't stop me from trying to understand where other traditions are coming from in order to see past these differences.
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