not-self strategy

One thing that has always troubled me about the 'orthodox' view concerning the Buddha's teachings on not-self (anatta) is that it seems to go too far, making ontological statements about something the Buddha himself remained silent on. As Thanissaro Bhikkhu rightly points out, the only place in the Pali Canon where the Buddha is asked point blank whether or not there's a self (SN 44.10), he refused to answer on the ground that "to hold either that there is a self or that there is no self is to fall into extreme forms of wrong view that make the path of Buddhist practice impossible" (No-self or Not-self?).

I think part of the reason this doctrine is so misunderstood is due to the fact that it's often taken out of context and given an ontological status it doesn't deserve. Personally, I think it's important to at least understand the purpose of specific teachings — especially those on not-self — so that they're used skillfully, which is essentially the point of the water-snake simile in MN 22. And when it comes to the teachings on not-self, I agree with Thanissaro Bhikkhu that "the anatta teaching is not a doctrine of no-self, but a not-self strategy for shedding suffering by letting go of its cause, leading to the highest, undying happiness."

The view that there is no self and the view that there is a self are both forms of self-view. Unfortunately (or fortunately depending on you how you look at it), the Buddha refused to directly answer whether or not there is a self (SN 44.10), stating that he didn't see "any such supporting (argument) for views [of self] from the reliance on which there would not arise sorrow and lamentation, pain, grief and despair" (MN 22). Instead, he focuses on events in and of themselves, as they are experienced, bypassing the question of self altogether. The Buddha says, "Who suffers," isn't a valid question, and suggests the alternative, "From what as a requisite condition comes suffering" (SN 12.35) in an effort to re-frame these questions in a way that's conducive to liberation — i.e., in terms of dependent co-arising — completely avoiding the question of 'who' or 'what' suffers. In other words, the teachings on not-self are ultimately pragmatic, soteriological methods rather than strictly ontological statements.

The Buddha makes it clear that everything he taught was for the sake of liberation/letting go (Ud 5.5), and "not for the purpose of holding onto" (MN 22). Moreover, while one may apply his teachings to other phenomena, the Buddha limits his scope to the six senses and their corresponding objects, noting that declarations about everything outside of this ultimately leads to vexation on the part of one making such statements when questioned as to their basis since such things lie beyond the range of description (SN 35.23).

In terms of what should be observed as not-self, the Buddha limits the use of this perception to the heaps of activities and processes on top of which we construct our sense of self — the 'all of personality identity' (sakkayasabba) — mainly the five aggregates (khandhas) or the six sense spheres (ayatana). For example, it should be clear from the context that when referring to 'the all' (sabba) and 'the world/cosmos' (loka), the Buddha was often using these terms as metaphors for the five aggregates or the six sense spheres; and while this may seem to cover everything, we must differentiate between our presumptions and our actual experience. For most of us, as unenlightened worldlings (puthujjana), we don't know the answer for sure. We must follow the Buddha's path to see the truth for ourselves. The Buddha never said that there's nothing beyond the experience of the five aggregates, he simply said that one wouldn't be able to explain such a thing because it "lies beyond range." That's not equivalent to saying that there's nothing there. As for the inclusion of nibbana in the term sabba (literally, 'all'), Thanissaro notes:

The Commentary's treatment of this discourse is very peculiar. To begin with, it delineates three other "All's" in addition to the one defined here, one of them supposedly larger in scope than the one defined here: the Allness of the Buddha's omniscience (literally, All-knowingness). This, despite the fact that the discourse says that the description of such an all lies beyond the range of explanation.

Secondly, the Commentary includes nibbana (unbinding) within the scope of the All described here — as a dhamma, or object of the intellect — even though there are many other discourses in the Canon specifically stating that nibbana lies beyond the range of the six senses and their objects. Sn 5.6, for instance, indicates that a person who has attained nibbana has gone beyond all phenomena (sabbe dhamma), and therefore cannot be described. MN 49 discusses a "consciousness without feature" (vinnanam anidassanam) that does not partake of the "Allness of the All." Furthermore, the following discourse (SN 35.24) says that the "All" is to be abandoned. At no point does the Canon say that nibbana is to be abandoned. Nibbana follows on cessation (nirodha), which is to be realized. Once nibbana is realized, there are no further tasks to be done.

Thus it seems more this discourse's discussion of "All" is meant to limit the use of the word "all" throughout the Buddha's teachings to the six sense spheres and their objects. As the following discourse shows, this would also include the consciousness, contact, and feelings connected with the sense spheres and their objects. Nibbana would lie outside of the word, "all." This would fit in with another point made several times in the Canon: that dispassion is the highest of all dhammas (Iti 90), while the arahant has gone beyond even dispassion (Sn 4.6; Sn 4.10).

This raises the question, if the word "all" does not include nibbana, does that mean that one may infer from the statement, "all phenomena are not-self" that nibbana is self? The answer is no. As AN 4.174 states, to even ask if there is anything remaining or not remaining (or both, or neither) after the cessation of the six sense spheres is to differentiate what is by nature undifferentiated (or to objectify the unobjectified — see the Introduction to MN 18). The range of differentiation goes only as far as the "All." Perceptions of self or not-self, which would count as differentiation, would not apply beyond the "All." When the cessation of the "All" is experienced, all differentiation is allayed.

When reading the discourses of the Buddha — whether they're translated by Thanissaro Bhikkhu, Bhikkhu Bodhi, or whomever — the picture I get is that the Buddha wasn't teaching or advocating a theory of self as much as stressing the idea that these very questions are a hindrance to the practice. One reason is that, in MN 2, existential questions of existence are considered by the Buddha to be "inappropriate attention." More specifically, both the views 'I have a self' and 'I have no self' are included in what the Buddha calls "a thicket of views, a wilderness of views, a contortion of views, a writhing of views, a fetter of views," and one who's bound by a fetter of views isn't freed from suffering and stress.

Another reason is found in MN 63. In this exchange, Malunkaputta demands that the Buddha answer ten questions concerning positions that are "undeclared, set aside, discarded by the Blessed One" — whether the cosmos is eternal or not eternal; whether the cosmos is finite or infinite; whether the soul and the body are the same or the soul is one thing and the body another; whether after death a Tathagata exists or does not exist, both exists and does not exist or neither exists nor does not exist — or else he will leave the Sangha. The Buddha responds by asking Malunkyaputta, "Did I ever say to you, 'Come, Malunkyaputta, live the holy life under me, and I will declare to you that 'The cosmos is eternal,' or 'The cosmos is not eternal,' or 'The cosmos is finite,' or 'The cosmos is infinite,' or 'The soul & the body are the same,' or 'The soul is one thing and the body another,' or 'After death a Tathagata exists,' or 'After death a Tathagata does not exist,' or 'After death a Tathagata both exists & does not exist,' or 'After death a Tathagata neither exists nor does not exist?'" Malunkaputta, of course, answers no. The Buddha further explains:

Malunkyaputta, if anyone were to say, 'I won't live the holy life under the Blessed One as long as he does not declare to me that "The cosmos is eternal,"... or that "After death a Tathagata neither exists nor does not exist,"' the man would die and those things would still remain undeclared by the Tathagata.

Taking all of these things into consideration, it's clear to me that the teachings on not-self, when looked at closely, aren't merely assertions that we have no self. They become something much more—a method for deconstructing our false perceptions about reality, as well as an important tool in removing the vast net of clinging that gives rise to suffering. When seen from this perspective, I think we can begin to see how these teachings — which seek to analyze the aspects of our experience on top of which we construct our sense of self in a process of, as the Buddha called it, 'I-making' and 'my-making' — help lead one towards dispassion, relinquishment, being unfettered, release. And this appears to me to be an active process that's done by the meditator; it's an observation, a contemplation and a realization, i.e., it's a teaching that one utilizes.

It seems to me that, if the Buddha really did take such a strong stance on the question of self as some people claim, he would've explicitly said there is, without a doubt, no self; or conversely, that there is, without a doubt, a self that's impermanent, or permanent and finite, or permanent and infinite, or separate from the body, or the same as the body, or neither the same as nor different from the body, etc. Instead, the Buddha taught his followers ways in which they could use what they had available to them (the five aggregates) to realize what was beyond them (nibbana). The question will inevitable arise, What is beyond them? But, as Sariputta warns in AN 4.174, asking what remains after the remainderless stopping and fading of the six contact-media "objectifies non-objectification" (or "complicates non-complication" as Thanissaro's original translation read):

The statement, 'With the remainderless stopping & fading of the six contact-media [vision, hearing, smell, taste, touch, & intellection] is it the case that there is anything else?' objectifies non-objectification. The statement, '... is it the case that there is not anything else ... is it the case that there both is & is not anything else ... is it the case that there neither is nor is not anything else?' objectifies non-objectification. However far the six contact-media go, that is how far objectification goes. However far objectification goes, that is how far the six contact media go. With the remainderless fading & stopping of the six contact-media, there comes to be the stopping, the allaying of objectification.

And when Thanissaro says that the teachings on not-self should be used a strategy, it's because that, beyond being studied, they're meant to be put into practice. Without the compliments of observing the precepts, cultivating states of concentration and developing direct insight into our experience of phenomena, nobody's understanding of what the Buddha taught will ever be complete. It should also be remembered that the Buddha said his teachings were not to be used simply to argue with other contemplatives (MN 22), and to focus on only one side of the practice is to destroy this carefully constructed balance designed by the Buddha.

In the simplest of terms, the Buddha taught that whatever is inconstant is stressful, and whatever is stressful is not-self—with the goal being to essentially take this [analytical] knowledge, along with a specific set of practices such as meditation, as a stepping stone to what I can only describe as a profound psychological event that radically changes the way the mind relates to experience. That doesn't mean, however, that the teachings on not-self are understood to deny individuality (MN 22) or imply that the conventional person doesn't exist (SN 22.22). The way I understand it, they merely break down the conceptual idea of a self — i.e., that which is satisfactory, permanent and completely subject to our control — in relation to the various aspects of our experience that we falsely cling to as 'me' or 'mine' (SN 22.59).

There's rarely a moment when the mind isn't clinging to this or that in one or more of the four ways (MN 11). Our identity jumps from one thing to another, wherever the clinging is strongest. Our sense of self is something which is always in flux, ever-changing from moment to moment in response to various internal and external stimuli, and yet at the same time, we tend to see it as a static thing. It's as if our sense of self desires permanence, but its very nature causes it to change every second. As the Buddha warns in SN 12.61:

It would be better for the uninstructed run-of-the-mill person to hold to the body composed of the four great elements, rather than the mind, as the self. Why is that? Because this body composed of the four great elements is seen standing for a year, two years, three, four, five, ten, twenty, thirty, forty, fifty, a hundred years or more. But what's called 'mind,' 'intellect,' or 'consciousness' by day and by night arises as one thing and ceases as another. Just as a monkey, swinging through a forest wilderness, grabs a branch. Letting go of it, it grabs another branch. Letting go of that, it grabs another one. Letting go of that, it grabs another one. In the same way, what's called 'mind,' 'intellect,' or 'consciousness' by day and by night arises as one thing and ceases as another.

To me, what the Buddha seems to be teaching in regards to not-self is that anywhere whatsoever one may look for a permanent and ever-lasting self, one will simply find oneself grasping at unsatisfactoriness and inconstancy out of ignorance [of the four noble truths]. Everything that we can possibly experience in regard to this body (rupa) and mind (nama) is inconstant and stressful; therefore, everything that we can possibly experience in regard to these phenomena isn't fit to be labelled 'me' or 'mine.' And when people try to use the consciousness of nibbana (vinnanam anidassanam) as an example of what lies beyond range but can be experienced at some point, they fail to take into consideration the various teachings concerning this attainment.

For one, to even experience nibbana, all forms of self-view must be abandoned. There's no longer any thoughts of 'I,' 'me' or 'mine' in terms of the six senses media. Moreover, as AN 4.174 illustrates, intellectually trying to uncover a self in that experience seeks to objectify the unobjectified, and as Thanissaro notes, "[T]he root of the classifications and perceptions of objectification is the thought, 'I am the thinker.' This thought forms the motivation for the questions that Ven. Maha Kotthita is presenting here: the sense of 'I am the thinker' can either fear or desire annihilation in the course of Unbinding. Both concerns get in the way of the abandoning of clinging, which is essential for the attainment of Unbinding, which is why the questions should not be asked."

In the Buddha's teachings, everything is a question of skill; and the question "What am I?" isn't a question worth asking. Soteriologically speaking, it's a distraction that isn't conducive to liberation. In trying to answer this question, our focus is taken off of the immediate practice, and instead becomes lost within a 'thicket of views' of self. It's a speculative trap that the noble disciple must learn to avoid, for it only leads to more suffering, more becoming, more craving, and not the arising of knowledge, the abandoning of craving, nibbana. In MN 2, the Buddha makes the danger inherent in this kind of inappropriate attention abundantly clear:

This is how he attends inappropriately: 'Was I in the past? Was I not in the past? What was I in the past? How was I in the past? Having been what, what was I in the past? Shall I be in the future? Shall I not be in the future? What shall I be in the future? How shall I be in the future? Having been what, what shall I be in the future?' Or else he is inwardly perplexed about the immediate present: 'Am I? Am I not? What am I? How am I? Where has this being come from? Where is it bound?'

As he attends inappropriately in this way, one of six kinds of view arises in him: The view I have a self arises in him as true & established, or the view I have no self... or the view It is precisely by means of self that I perceive self... or the view It is precisely by means of self that I perceive not-self... or the view It is precisely by means of not-self that I perceive self arises in him as true & established, or else he has a view like this: This very self of mine — the knower that is sensitive here & there to the ripening of good & bad actions — is the self of mine that is constant, everlasting, eternal, not subject to change, and will stay just as it is for eternity. This is called a thicket of views, a wilderness of views, a contortion of views, a writhing of views, a fetter of views. Bound by a fetter of views, the uninstructed run-of-the-mill person is not freed from birth, aging, & death, from sorrow, lamentation, pain, distress, & despair. He is not freed, I tell you, from suffering & stress.

Ultimately, I think trying to approach the teachings on not-self from an purely intellectual standpoint runs the risk of turning them into a metaphysical doctrine of self, which I believe falls short of their intended purpose. The Dhamma itself isn't just a collection of words, it's something to be utilized, to be experienced; and the Buddha didn't teach anatta as a doctrine of self, he taught anatta as part of his overall strategy to overcome suffering. There are those who'll automatically disagree with this statement, but if we put the Buddha's entire forty-five years of teaching into context, we'll see that it only has one taste, the taste of liberation (Ud 5.5). And when it comes right down to it, the Buddha only taught two things:

Both formerly & now, it is only stress that I describe, and the cessation of stress.

If we start from here and then ask what part do the teachings on not-self play in achieving this goal, I think we can more easily unveil its important and vital role. When it comes to the four noble truths, one of the main things to be understood in the comprehension of the first noble truth is that, what are called the three characteristics of existence (tilakkhana) are present throughout the most discernible aspects of our experience on top of which we construct our sense of self. When the mind is concentrated, it can be more clearly seen that whatever is inconstant (anicca), whatever is unstable and subject to change, is stressful, unsatisfactory (dukkha); and to hold onto anything that's inconstant, subject to change, break-up and dissolution, is a cause for mental stress, suffering.

Why, then, would we want cling to something that's inconstant, and by its very nature stressful, as a self? Would it proper to regard what's inconstant, stressful and subject to change as 'This is mine. This is my self. This is what I am'? And if our happiness is based on such unstable footing, is it really true happiness? Looking at it this way, I think we can start to see how the teachings on not-self, combined with those on inconstancy, fit into the Buddha's overall strategy to end suffering. As Thanissaro succinctly puts it, "We apply these standards to the experiences we consume: if they aren't long-term, then no matter how pleasant they might be, they aren't true happiness. If they're not true happiness, there's no reason to claim them as 'mine.' This insight forms the basis for the Three Characteristics that the Buddha taught for inducing a sense of dispassion for normal time- and space-bound experience" (All About Change).

This may be a bit of nonsense, but in one of the ways I like to look at it, the conventional viewpoint (sammuti sacca) explains things through subject, verb and object whereas the ultimate viewpoint (paramattha sacca) explains things through verb alone. In essence, things are being viewed from the perspective of activities and processes.

This, I think, is incredibly difficult to see, but perhaps what happens here is that once self-identity view (sakkaya-ditthi) is removed, the duality of subject and object is also removed, thereby revealing the level of mere conditional phenomena, i.e., dependent co-arising in action. This mental process is 'seen,' ignorance is replaced by 'knowledge and vision of things as they are' (yatha-bhuta-nana-dassana), and nibbana, then, would be the 'letting go' of what isn't self through the dispassion (viraga) invoked in seeing the inconstant (anicca) and stressful (dukkha) nature of clinging to false refuges that are neither fixed nor stable (anatta).

In addition to all of this, I think listening to Thanissaro's talks on the three characteristics and the five aggregates will help to shed some more light onto the reasons he teaches anatta in this way. When studying these teachings, however, I think it should be kept in mind that the purpose of the practice isn't to clone someone else's insights, it's to develop our own. And one of the main points I believe Thanissaro is trying to convey in his essay, "Not-self Strategy," is that one shouldn't study these teachings in an effort to construct a metaphysical view out of them, but in order to put them into practice. It's only after putting these things to the test that we're able to know, through own own experience, those same insights.

buddhahood, mahayana vs. theravada

Besides presenting what's said to be a complete path to buddhahood via, as Thanissaro Bhikkhu describes it in The Ten Perfections, "traditions set in motion by the experiences of visionaries from the beginning of the common era," one of the main difference between Mahayana and Theravada is that the former has a fundamentally different (or at least expanded) conception of buddhahood and what a buddha is capable of doing.

In Theravada, a sammasambuddha (perfectly enlightened buddha) is understood to be a person who achieves perfect enlightenment without having heard the Dhamma from others, and is able to effectively teach it to others. Once their natural lifespan is over (which, according to DN 16, a buddha can extend if asked), they pass away and attain total unbinding (parinibbana), a freedom that's characterized by the complete cessation of the five aggregates (khandha).

In Mahayana, however, a buddha isn't just one who achieves perfect enlightenment and teaches the Dhamma to others, but, according to the Mahaparinirvana Sutra and certain Tathagatagarbha sutras, one who also possesses purified (i.e., eternal and unchanging) aggregates that are incomprehensible the unawakened.

As such, from the Mahayana point of view, there's nothing stopping a buddha from 'popping back' into samsara (the cycle of death and rebirth), especially considering that, for them, the distinction between samsara and nirvana is little more than an illusion when viewed from the ultimate standpoint of the dharmakaya or 'truth-body.' Moreover, their conception of causality allows for the continuation of the mindstream after the breakup of the body. As Namdrol from E-Sangha once explained it to me:

If the causes if a mindstream were solely afflictive, then with the exhaustion of the karmic share that sustains the life force of the body, and thus the life of a Buddha or an arhat, I might be inclined to agree that the mind stream of a Buddha or an arhat would cease at death, since all causes for its continuance would be exhausted too. However there is a slight problem with this: if the mindstream's causes were solely afflictive, why does the mind not cease with nirvana in toto? Why does the mind continue after the eradication of all afflictions in a Buddha and an arhat? And if the mind continues after the eradication of the afflictions of a Buddha, etc., why could it not continue after the breakup of the body of a Buddha, etc., albeit in a non-afflicted state? In fact, Peter Harvey's interesting book, The Selfless Mind, makes this very suggestion on page 250 where he summerizes all of his arguments and findings.

In other words, not only does bodhicitta act as a cause to help keep the bodhisattva on the path to buddhahood throughout their innumerable lifetimes, it acts as a positive, non-afflictive cause for the continuation of the enlightened being/mindstream as well. And this is perfectly logical and consistent within Mahayana's own understanding of itself, which includes certain terms that Theravada understands differently.

For example, the Theravada standpoint is that the cause of said mindstream (as well as the body) is kamma (literally 'action'), both skillful and unskillful, although I'm not entirely sure if this corresponds to afflictive and non-afflictive in Mahayana. Nevertheless, in the Pali Canon, the noble eightfold path is said to be the kamma that leads to the ending of kamma (AN 4.235).

When it comes to the standard explanation of why the mind and body don't [always] cease with that attainment of nirvana, it's said that as long as the lifespan of the aggregates isn't completely exhausted — which itself depends upon the amount of input remaining from past kamma — the mind and body of an arahant (noble one) will continue. When this input from past kamma is exhausted, there's said to be complete cessation of both mind and body.

A Mahayanist, on the other hand, would probably disagree with this in an ultimate sense, saying that this is only how it appears from the point of view of samsara (think relativity here), but not from the point of view of high-level Bodhisattvas and fully enlightened Buddhas.

Another main difference is Mahayana's understanding of nirvana, which is also understood differently in Mahayana. In Mahayana, those who have attained nirvana still have work to do. This idea originates from certain Mahayana texts such as the Saddharmapundarika Sutra, where the arahant is said not to have reached final nirvana. Essentially, they're seen as being intoxicated with the bliss of the samadhi of cessation, not the nirvana that's attained by a fully enlightened buddha.

Moreover, it's said that buddhas are then able to awaken these individuals from their temporary cessation in order for them to continue towards complete buddhahood (making buddhas extremely important), which is characterized by omniscience. This is said to be due to buddhahood being the result of wisdom and merit accumulation, and not just the eradication of afflictions (which isn't too different from Theravada sans the awakening of arahants bit). As Thubten Chodron explains it:

In the Sanskrit canon, or at least in the Tibetan tradition, when you have arhatship without remainder you abide in meditative equipoise on emptiness for a long, long time. So consciousness still exists, the person still exists, it's merely labeled in dependence upon those aggregates, which are not tainted aggregates, but not completely purified aggregates. Although they're free from ignorance, so they're untainted. Yes, they would be untainted. They still have the cognitive obscurations but they would be untainted. So you abide in the nirvana for eons in your meditative equipoise until eventually the Buddha wakes you up and says, “You have to work for the benefit of sentient beings, your job isn't really done.” So that's from a Mahayana viewpoint, what's happened to the arhats.

The nature of Shakyamuni in Mahayana is a bit more complicated as well. For one thing, Mahayana isn't homogeneous in a number of areas; but in general, the historical Buddha is seen to be a nirmanakaya (created-body), i.e., a manifestation of the dharmakaya who appears for the benefit of sentient beings.

Of course, all of this contrasts with how the Buddha and nirvana are presented and understood in Theravada, which is why these inter-tradition dialogues often end with everyone talking past each other. Whether or not one agrees with all of this is irrelevant, however, since neither tradition is the arbiter of all things Buddhist. The best we can do is agree to disagree. To steal a phrase from tiltbillings, "The Mahayana does not get to define the Theravada for Theravadins any more than the Theravada gets to define the Mahayana for Mahayanists."

I'm not saying that one can't be critical of certain ideas or have inter-tradition debates, only that nobody can really 'win' such debates when each side is logically consistent within itself, and it all depends on what one takes as the basis for their views. It's entirely possible, for example, that a person who accepts the commentarial literature in Theravada as authoritative can have serious disagreements with someone who only accepts the Suttas, so just imagine the amount of disagreement possible with someone who accepts an additional collection of teachings that lies outside of Theravada altogether.

This is why I often try to look beyond these debates and focus instead on other criteria for choosing what to accept as the basis for my views, things such as archeology, scholarly opinion, textual analysis, etc. I'm just as liable to reject the majority of the Theravadin commentarial literature as I am the majority of Sanskrit sutras. Don't get me wrong, though. That doesn't mean I don't find things in each I like, admire or even adopt when I think they're beneficial; and it certainly doesn't stop me from trying to understand where other traditions are coming from in order to see past these differences.

the agganna sutta

I've been having a rather interesting discussion with some members at dhammawheel.com about the Agganna Sutta of the Digha Nikaya lately, mostly stemming from something I wrote about a month ago:

As for DN 27, the Buddha tells a story about the beginning of life on this world to two brahmins which, in the end, was used to illustrate how the way to liberation is beyond caste and lineage. So, in this regard, the Buddha does give what can be interpreted as a rough theory of evolution to the pair of brahmins in that the physical characteristics of the mythological beings in question change due to environmental changes and interactions, as well as a description the universe somewhat akin to the oscillating universe theory.

I think that, when taken literally, the creation myth in DN 27 can be seen as an attempt to give a naturalistic explanation of the origins of life and the universe, and Darwin's fairly well-proven theory of evolution certainly isn't inconsistent with this, which makes many new Buddhists breath a sigh of relief. That being said, I agree with Prof. Gombrich that, taking the context of DN 27 into account, this sutta is a lively and ingenious parody that's actually meant to make fun of the very need for a cosmology as a foundation for religious development (How Buddhism Began: The Conditioned Genesis of the Early Teachings, pg. 81-82).

Personally, I see Buddhism as dealing exclusively with mental stress and its cessation (i.e., psychology), not biology, or physics, etc. And while some people get excited when they discover that Buddhism contains teachings which seem to be in accord with modern science, I think they can often be misleading and shouldn't be taken too seriously, or at least, too literally. I think this is especially true of DN 27 considering that recent observations of cosmic background radiation indicate the universe is actually expanding at an accelerated rate, hence there may not be any contraction or 'Big Crunch.' (Lawrence Krauss mentions this in his talk at the 2009 AAI Conference; although it should also be noted that Roger Penrose recently challenged the commonly-held 'inflationary theory' of cosmology with his suggestion that analysis of cosmic microwave background shows echoes of previous Big Bang-like events.)

There have been some valid and thought-provoking criticisms of what I've written above. One thing that was brought up by yuttadhammo is that, "This argument assumes that the word 'sa.mva.t.tati' in the Agganna Sutta means 'contracts', which it doesn't." This criticism is mainly levelled against Bhikkhu Bodhi's translation of DN 27, however, which reads:

There comes a time, Vasettha, when, sooner or later after a long period, this world contracts. At the time of contraction, beings are mostly born in the Abhassara Brahma world. And there they dwell, mind-made, feeding on delight, self-luminous, moving through the air, glorious—and they stay like that for a very long time. But sooner or later, after a very long period, this world begins to expand again. At a time of expansion the beings from the Abhassara Brahma world, having passed away from there, are mostly reborn in this world. Here they dwell, mind-made, feeding on delight, self-luminous, moving through the air, glorious—and they stay like that for a very long time.

Having a look at the Pali myself, the words translated here as 'contraction' and 'expansion' are samvattati and vivattati respectively. I agree with Phra Noah that 'contraction' and 'expansion' aren't generally the best translations, ('dissolve' and 'evolve' might be better), and I'm not sure why Bhikkhu Bodhi translates them this way. Perhaps it's due to something in the commentarial literature, or maybe he simply thought it was more appropriate given the overall context. Either way, I think this is something that merits further discussion.

Another good point was made in the same thread by son of dhamma, who said, "I don't consider that the world being talked about in the Agganna Sutta is 'the universe'. In fact I don't see why anyone would have this notion after considering the context." Taking another look at the Pali, I'm inclined to agree.

Since the Buddha uses the word loko or 'world,' which is often used as a metaphor for the six sense spheres, I agree that given the context, 'the world' being referenced is most likely not the universe but the world of sensory experience, which, incidentally, makes me even more convinced that this sutta is a lively and ingenious parody that's actually meant to make fun of the very need for a cosmology as a foundation for religious development. However, it should be noted that according to Nyanatiloka's Manual of Buddhist Terms and Doctrines, the term loka denotes "the 3 spheres of existence comprising the whole universe," which seems to be more in line with how Buddhist cosmology has traditionally been presented in Theravada (i.e., expanding and contracting world-systems), so perhaps this term should be analyzed in more detail as well.

All in all, I'm still of the opinion that questions about the origin of the universe are ultimately irrelevant to the practice, and this is mainly due to the focus of the practice itself, which is simply to comprehend suffering, abandon its cause, realize its cessation and develop the path leading to that cessation (SN 56.11).

puggalavada: a brief look

This revised version of something I wrote back in 2006 initially began as response to a member's post, which eventually evolved into a topic in its own right. This entry is simply an attempt to share some of the things that I found regarding the Puggalavadins, as well as my own thoughts on the subject.

Be honest. How many times have you ever pondered the teachings on not-self (anatta) in an effort to discover whether there's a hidden self (atta) lurking around in the shadows somewhere? I can admit that I was once interested in pinning down the exact meaning of 'self,' 'not-self,' and whatever was in-between, mainly in an attempt to discover the answer to the timeless question, Who am I?

The difficulties in understanding the Buddha's teachings on rebirth (punabbhava, literally 'again becoming') along with not-self have plagued practitioners since the beginning of the Buddha's dispensation. Throughout the beginning of my own journey into Buddhism, I flirted with a version of the Puggalavadin view of self, which was helped along by the fact that I was previously a practicing Pagan with a fairly strong belief in the existence of a type of self or soul already. However, I quickly discovered a key problem: I was in no position to determine the exact nature of self from the Buddhist point of view when I'd yet to even grasp the basic tenets of Buddhism itself.

So in search of an answer, I turned to the discourses of the Buddha recorded in the Pali Canon, hungrily looking for something I could wrap my intellectual understanding around. At the beginning, I mistook the meaning of SN 44.10, thinking that perhaps the Buddha was just being coy and hinting at something there that was so unlike what anybody thought was there that it couldn't simply be labelled as 'self.' But after spending some time with a monk from the Thai Forest tradition, and more time reading the Suttas, I began to realize that the Buddha wasn't hinting at a self or a lack thereof at all; he was simply avoiding the misunderstandings and spectrum of wrong views the issue itself presents. At that point, I resigned myself to leave the question of self alone, deciding that that was what the Buddha himself recommended thanks to suttas such as AN 4.42 and MN 2.

I could now clearly see that trying to affirm or even deny a self of any sort wouldn't lead me to the cessation of suffering, so what was the point? I realized that whatever the truth may be, it must be 'seen' for oneself. It's not something that can adequately be put into words without giving the wrong impression, and it's not something that can be understood solely through reason; it's something that must eventually be experienced. All of the teachings and techniques expounded by the Buddha are ultimately meant to lead to 'knowledge and vision of things as they are' (yatha-bhuta-nana-dassana), and subsequently, to awakening. "Ah, so it's like this."

As for the Puggalavadins, they went by the same collection of teachings (sans the Abhidhamma Pitaka) as the other accepted schools of Buddhism, and they weren't necessarily deemed 'heretical' at the time of their existence. It's reported that their sect covered much of India before the decline of Buddhism in that area, and the main difference between them and the other sects existent at the time was their interpretation of the Buddha's teaching on not-self. There was much debate at the time as to what the Buddha was really pointing at in regard to the existence or non-existence of self — that which is "permanent, stable, eternal, not subject to change" (SN 24.3) — with sutta references presented as evidence by both sides. One of the most famous and contentious is SN 22.22, with its unique mention of the 'person' (puggala) as the "carrier of the burden." Beyond this debate, however, their methods of practice were, as far as we know, quite similar.

This brings me to my point. It seems that even today, certain teachers in the Theravada tradition have views and teachings that seem to mirror the ancient Puggalavadin's, long after the latter's disappearance. There are certain teachers in the Thai Forest tradition, for example, whose teachings regarding the purified mind (citta) bear a striking resemblance to the Puggalavadin's regarding the person. That's not to say that they believe in, or teach about, a 'self' as the Puggalavadins did, but that they teach in a way that does at least seem to leave the question open. Thanissaro Bhikkhu, for example, wrote a controversial essay called "The Not-self Strategy," which some criticize as being an "eel-wriggling interpretation of anatta as a strategy." And then there are quotes like this from "Five Piles of Bricks":

Other passages mention a consciousness in this freedom — "without feature or surface, without end, luminous all around" — lying outside of time and space, experienced when the six sense spheres stop functioning (MN 49). In this it differs from the consciousness-khandha, which depends on the six sense spheres and can be described in such terms as near or far, past, present, or future. Consciousness without feature is thus the awareness of Awakening. And the freedom of this awareness carries over even when the awakened person returns to ordinary consciousness.

But there are others who are even more suspect in the eyes of the 'orthodox' Theravadin community, such as Ajahn Maha Boowa, who some accuse of holding more blatantly 'eternalistic' views. For example, in the appendix to his Arahattamagga Arahattaphala - The Path to Arahantship, he says things like "the true power of the citta's own nature is that it knows and does not die" (99). The real question is, Are the Puggalavadin's views, albeit subtly, still around today?

To begin with, who exactly were the Puggalavadins? From what little we do know, they were a sect of Buddhism that arose in about 300 BCE. They broke off from the older Sthaviravadins (part of which eventually evolved into our modern day 'Theravada' tradition). Their sect was known as the 'Personalist' school because of their belief that, while there is no 'self,' there is a 'person,' which is neither the same as, nor different from, the aggregates (khandhas).

The Puggalavadins more or less accepted and used the same collection of discourses (Sutta Pitika) and shared the same the monastic rules (Vinaya Pitika) as the Sthaviravadins, but they didn't accept the Abhidhamma Pitika, a systematization of certain concepts and terms found throughout the Sutta Pitaka — with additional concepts and terms added in for logical consistency — which was possibly intended to act as a pedagogical tool, as well as an attempt to describe the ultimate nature of reality. (Many scholars also agree that the Abhidhamma Pitaka is a later addition to the original teachings that gradual developed over several centuries. This is not only evident from the fact that the Abhidhamma utilizes words that are found nowhere else in the Canon, but also from the fact that each school had their own version, and some, like the Sautrantika school, even rejecting it altogether.)

As with other sects, they did have different versions of certain suttas, but the majority of their canon was apparently close to that of the Sthaviravadins. This is significant because they had to have comparable texts and/or teachings to be able to debate their views with their Sthaviravadin counterparts without automatically being deemed heretical. Unfortunately, almost none of their personal texts have survived besides a few poorly translated Chinese versions, so who can say how close their respective canons actually were.

In any case, after time, the 'orthodox' sect of the Sthaviravadins that eventually evolved into what we call Theravada deemed the Puggalavadin's take on the 'person' to be a misinterpretation of what the Buddha taught — mistaking the Buddha's conventional usage of speech for something metaphysical — and saw their rejection of the Abhidhamma as unorthodox, therefore they were officially labeled as heretical. Perhaps this was done even earlier, but we know for sure that in the Theravada Abhidhamma (as well as other versions) there's a section dealing with the refutation of heretical views including the Puggalavadin's called the Kathavatthu or Points of Controversy. An example of such a refutation from the Sarvastivadin viewpoint is found in Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakosa, an abstract of which can be found in Edward Conze's book, Buddhist Scriptures (pg. 103-06):

The Personalist Controversy

Is final deliverance then possible outside this Dharma, and can it be won on the basis of non-Buddhist doctrines? - No, it cannot, for all other teachings are corrupted by false ideas about a 'self'. Instead of taking it as a mere conventional term applied to a series of impersonal processes, they believe in a self which is a substance independent of the Skandhas. But the mere belief in such a self must of necessity generate defilements. Those who hold it will be forced to pursue life in the Samsaric world, and will be unable to free themselves completely from it.

The Personalist thesis, first part: But is it not true that a Buddhist school, the Personalists, speak of a Person who is neither identical with the Skandhas, nor different from them? And is not this Person a kind of self? And yet, as Buddhists they should be able to win deliverance! - We must ask ourselves whether this Person exists as a real entity, i.e. as one of the separate elements of existence, like the elementary sight-objects, sounds, and so on, which careful analysis reveals; or whether it has a merely nominal existence, which denotes a combination of simple elements, as 'milk' is a combination of sights, smells, tastes and touchables.

The Personalist: Why should not either assumption be true? - Vasubandbu: If the Person is a real entity with a nature of its own, it must be different from the elementary data, just as these are different from one another. It must then be either produced by causes, or unconditioned. In the first case it is not eternal, as you maintain, and you must be able to state its conditions in detail. In the second case you adopt a clearly non-Buddhistic doctrine, and, in addition, your Person could not do anything, and would be a rather useless hypothesis. The Person is therefore unlikely to be a real entity. But if you regard it as a mere designation, then your view does not differ in the least from ours. - The Personalist: We claim that there is a Person; but we do not say that he is an entity. Nor do we believe that he exists merely as a designation for the Skandhas. What we say is that the word 'Person' denotes a kind of structural unity which is found in correlation with the Skandhas of one individual, i.e. with those elements which are actually present, internal to him, and appropriated by him.

The Personalist thesis, second part: The Personalist also teaches that the Person is 'ineffable', that his rektion to the elements cannot be defined, that he is neither identical nor non-identical with them. He distinguishes five kinds of cognizable things -the first three are the conditioned dharmas, i.e. those past, future and present; the fourth is the Unconditioned; and the fifth is the 'ineffable', and refers to the Person. - But if the Person were quite ineffable, if nothing at all could be stated about it, then one could also not say of it either that it is the fifth category or that it is not!

The Personalist: It is perfectly true that the Person is not an object of consciousness. - Vasubandhu: Very well, but then one can never be aware of it; if unaware of it, one cannot cognize it; if it cannot be an object of cognition, how can its existence ever be established? And if one cannot do that, your system falls to pieces. - Vasubandhu then quotes a number of canonical texts, of which I give three here: The Bimbisarasutra says: 'The foolish ignorant common people, putting their trust in words, imagine that there is such a thing as a self. But there is neither "I" nor "mine". There are only dharmas, ill at ease, future, present and past.' In the Kshudragama the Buddha says to the Brahmin Badari: 'Badari, one who has heard the four holy truths, he can free himself from all bonds: thought alone defiles, thought alone purifies. The self has, in fact, not the nature of a self. To think that there is a self is a perverted view. There is nowhere here a living being, there is no self; dharmas alone together with their causes do exist.

No person can be found in all the Skandhas when examined. And, having seen that a person is inwardly empty, you must also see the outside world as empty. Even those who meditate on emptiness cannot be said to exist.' And another Sutra says: 'Five calamities result from a belief in a self: wrong opinions about the actual status of a self, an individual, a soul; non-distinction from non-Buddhists; one goes astray on a wrong road; thought does not leap forward into emptiness, finds no serenity in it, does not abide in it, does not resolve upon it; one will never be sufficiently purified to win the qualities of a saint.'

The Personalist: These texts have no authority for us. They do not form part of our Scriptures. - Vasubandhu: What then is the authority behind your system - your sect or the word of the Buddha? How can you claim the Buddha as your Teacher, how can you be Shakyamuni's sons, if you do not accept all the Buddha's words as binding on you? - The Personalist: The texts you have just quoted are not the Buddha's own words, and they are not in the Scriptures of our school. -Vasubandhu: That is not very convincing. For all the other schools accept these texts, and they are not in conflict either with other Sutras, or with the Dharma. This is therefore sheer effrontery on your part. And how then, incidentally, do you explain the Sutra which says: 'To mistake for a self that which is not a self, that is a perverted notion, a perverted idea, a perverted opinion.' - The Personalist: The Sutra only says that it is a perversion to mistake a not-self for a self; but it does not say that it is a perversion to recognize a self as a self. And also: According to your doctrines the Lord could not possibly be omniscient. You say that all thoughts and mental activities change incessantly, and that each mental act lasts only for one moment. How then can it know all the dharmas? Only an abiding Person can be omniscient. - Vasubandhu: May I point out that then your Person would be eternal, and that contradicts your statements that we cannot say whether he is eternal or not. And this is how we account for the Buddha's omniscience: For us the word 'Buddha' is a term denoting a series of momentary events. We do not believe that in one single moment he just knows all the dharmas simultaneously. The unique feature of his series of momentary mental actions lies in the fact that, by the mere act of turning his mind on anything, there arises immediately a correct and unperverted knowledge of any object whatever, if there should be at the same time the desire to know it. That is the sense in which we speak of 'omniscience'.

The Personalist: Why then, if the word 'person' means nothing but the five Skandhas which form the range of grasping, did the Lord teach the 'Burden Sutra', which says: 'I will teach you the burden, its taking up, its laying down, and the bearer of the burden. The five Skandhas, which are the range of grasping, are the burden. Craving takes up the burden. The renunciation of craving lays it down. The bearer of the burden is the person: this venerable man, with such and such a name, born so and so, of such and such a clan, who sustains himself on this or that food, experiences these pleasures and pains, lives for just so long, stays here for just so long, terminates his life-span in just this way.' For, if 'person' were only another name for the Skandhas, if 'person' and Skandhas were actually identical, then the burden would carry itself, and that is absurd. - Vasubandhu: You have misunderstood the message of this Sutra. The Lord speaks of a 'person' here only in order to conform to the usage of the world. In fact this so-called 'personality' is nothing but a series of consecutive impersonal momentary events, all of them linked to suffering. But the processes which have taken place in the past cause suffering in those which succeed them. The preceding Skandhas are therefore called the 'burden', the subsequent ones its 'bearer'.

The Personalist: Moreover, another Sutra says: 'One person, when he arises, when he is born in the world, is born for the weal of the many. Who is that one person? It is the Tathagata.' - Vasubandhu: Here again the Lord just conforms to the usage of the world. For that reason he treats here as a unit that which is in fact a complex; it is quite usual for people to speak of a 'word', although it is in fact a compound of syllables, or of a heap of rice, although it obviously comprises a multiplicity of grains. In addition, this Sutra says of the person that 'he arises', and that, contrary to your teaching, makes him into something conditioned. - The Personalist: The term 'arises' has one meaning when applied to the dharmas, another when applied to the Person. A dharma is said to 'arise' because it exists now after not having existed before. A person, however, is said to 'arise', or to 'be born' when, on rebirth in a certain form, he takes up, or acquires, certain constituents, which make him into 'this man', 'this animal', 'this ghost', and so on. It is quite usual to say of a man who has acquired a knowledge of grammar that 'a grammarian is born', or 'a grammarian has arisen', but that does not mean that he has come from nothing. The person 'arises' in the sense that he acquires at a certain time a certain series of attributes, in the above quotation those of a Buddha. - Vasubandhu: This explanation has been expressly condemned by the Lord. For He has said: 'There is action, and there is the retribution of action. But apart from the causally linked sequence of impersonal dharmas there is no one who acts, there is no one who gives up one set of Skandhas, and takes up others instead." In consequence there is no person who gives up his Skandhas at death and takes up others at rebirth.

The Personalist: Nevertheless, the Person is real, for it has been said: 'To say that the self does not exist, in truth and in reality, is a wrong view.' - Vasubandhu: This is no proof, for it has also been said that to affirm the existence of a self is a wrong view. We Abhidharmists believe that both the general affirmation and the general negation of a self are extremist views, in accordance with the well-known saying of the Vatsagotra-sutra: 'Those, Ananda, who affirm a self fall into the extreme of the belief in its eternal continuation; those who deny it fall into the extreme of the belief in its eventual annihilation.'

The Personalist; If the Person does not exist, who then is it that wanders about in Samsara? It is difficult to see how the Samsara itself can wander about. - Vasubandhu: The correct explanation is, however, quite simple: When a flame burns a piece of wood, one says that it wanders along it; nevertheless there is nothing but a series of flame-moments. Likewise there is a continuous series of processes which incessantly renews itself, and which is falsely called a living being. Impelled by craving, this series is said to 'wander' in Samsara.

The Personalist: If the momentary processes alone exist, how can you explain these words of the Lord, when he said, on recalling one of his former lives: 'This sage Sunetra, who existed in the past, that Sunetra was I.' All the psycho-physical elements have changed, and it can therefore only be the 'person' that makes the Buddha and Sunetra identical. -Vasubandhu: What in fact is it that the Lord thinks of when he speaks here of I? If, as you say, he means the 'person', then the past 'I' is identical with the present I, and your 'person' will be permanent, as against your intentions. For us, however, the Lord only meant to say that his actually present dharmas are parts of the same continuous series of dharmas as those of Sunetra. As one says: 'This fire has burned its way to here.' - In any case, you assert the existence of a real self, which is of a nature so subtle and elusive, that the Tathagatas alone can see it. In that case, the Buddhas would become believers in I and 'mine', with all its pernicious consequences for the spiritual life. They will form an attachment to that part of the universe which they come to consider as their own, and in that way they will be far removed from deliverance! -The Personalist: It is only when, as is the habit of non-Buddhists, something which is not the true Self is mistaken for the true Self, that one will feel affection for that pretended self. If, however, one sees, as the Buddhas do, the Ineffable Person as the true self, then, because that actually is the true self, no affection for it is thereby engendered.

So back to the question: Are their views still around today? In my opinion, the answer is yes and no. While some teachers, like Thanissaro, tend to be somewhat suspect and are often accused of holding quasi-eternalistic, Puggalavadin-type views by strict traditionalists, I believe that they're actually teaching wisely by using a variety of skillful means to burn away clinging (upadana) to all forms of self-view equally, from the idea of 'I have a self,' to the idea of 'I have no self,' and everything in between. And while some of Thanissaro's writings and talks did make me seriously question his approach at first, I've since come to the conclusion that his teachings aren't at odds with the Buddha, although they do occasionally conflict with what some consider to be Theravadin orthodoxy.

The way in which Thanissaro writes about not-self, while seeming to leave the question of self open, actually lays the question aside altogether. It may appear that he's hinting at a 'self' lurking around somewhere, but in reality, he's going by what the Suttas themselves actually say (e.g., DN 11, MN 2, MN 8, MN 22, SN 22.85, SN 44.10, etc.). On closer examination, it's clear (to me at least) that he tries to teach people in a way that discourages both attachment to a belief in a self and an attachment to not-self as a substitute. This might not sound like it makes very much sense, but it's actually quite ingenious. Many people simply attach to the idea of having no self instead of a self, which the Buddha also warns against:

This is how he attends inappropriately: 'Was I in the past? Was I not in the past? What was I in the past? How was I in the past? Having been what, what was I in the past? Shall I be in the future? Shall I not be in the future? What shall I be in the future? How shall I be in the future? Having been what, what shall I be in the future?' Or else he is inwardly perplexed about the immediate present: 'Am I? Am I not? What am I? How am I? Where has this being come from? Where is it bound?'

As he attends inappropriately in this way, one of six kinds of view arises in him: The view I have a self arises in him as true & established, or the view I have no self... or the view It is precisely by means of self that I perceive self... or the view It is precisely by means of self that I perceive not-self... or the view It is precisely by means of not-self that I perceive self arises in him as true & established, or else he has a view like this: This very self of mine — the knower that is sensitive here & there to the ripening of good & bad actions — is the self of mine that is constant, everlasting, eternal, not subject to change, and will stay just as it is for eternity. This is called a thicket of views, a wilderness of views, a contortion of views, a writhing of views, a fetter of views. Bound by a fetter of views, the uninstructed run-of-the-mill person is not freed from birth, aging, & death, from sorrow, lamentation, pain, distress, & despair. He is not freed, I tell you, from suffering & stress.

In addition, Thanissaro, contrary to what some might think, never suggests that the teachings on not-self and kamma (literally 'action') don't work together, implying the need for a pseudo-self to have it all make sense. This is a horrendous but easily cleared up misunderstanding of what he says in his essay "No-self or Not-self?" Far from claiming that the teachings on not-self and kamma don't fit well together, he's simply explaining that this is a perception many people have (i.e., they don't seem to fit), especially Westerners with a Judeo-Christian background, when they learn about Buddhism and first encounter these teachings. More importantly, by laying aside the question of whether or not there's a self altogether, he's attempting to approach the subject in the same way the Buddha does in SN 44.10 since, in his words, "to hold either that there is a self or that there is no self is to fall into extreme forms of wrong view that make the path of Buddhist practice impossible."

However, there are some who've studied the Puggalavadin's doctrines and views and have actually come out in favour of them, and quite openly in fact. One such person is D. Amarasiri Weeraratne. In his article "Puggalavada and Theravada Buddhist teachings," he writes:

Upto the time of the 2nd Council 200 years after the Buddha, there were no sectarian divisions among Buddhist monks. The Buddha had permitted the Sangha to change minor rules after his demise, according to the wishes of the fraternity and by a majority decision. In pursuance of this concession, the monks of the Vajji country well known for its republican form of government called for the adoption of ten minor changes in the Vinaya rules.

The hard core orthodox and conservative monks headed by Revata and Sabbakami resisted these changes. Hence the conservative elders disallowed these changes. Consequently, the dissident monks broke away from the conservative elders (The Theras) and established the Mahasanghika Sect and held their own Sangha Council. Thus came about the first division in the Sangha. The Maha Sanghikas as their name implies constituted the majority of the Sangha. The Theras constituted a minority of hard core reactionaries who were opposed to an form of change.

Between the 2nd and 3rd Councils 236 years after the Buddha the Conservative Elders (The Theras) broke off into two sects, viz: Vibjjavadins and Sautrantikas. Almost simultaneously the Mahasangikas also broke off into a sect called Puggalavadin. (Believers in persons.) The Vibjjavadins broke off into three sects, one of which was the Theravada - the Buddhism we have in Sri Lanka, Burma, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos etc. Thus you will see that the Puggalavada Sect and the Theravada Sect were the earliest of the sectarian divisions in Buddhism.

Controversy on Abhidhamma

The chief characteristic of the Puggalavada Sect was their rejection of the Abhidharma Pitaka as a teaching of the Buddha. They maintained that Abhidharma is apocryphal scripture cooked up by the Theravada Elders between the 2nd and 3rd Councils and adopted at the 3rd Council. The Puggalavadins as well as Sautranitikas rejected the Abhidharma Pitaka and had only 2 Pitakas viz: Sutta and Vinaya Pitakas.

In the Suttas the Buddha speaks of a person who fares on in Sansara, performs good and bad deeds and receives reward or distribution for them. In fact the entire Sutta Pitaka is based on the assumption that there is a person (puggala) who is subject to the sufferings in Sansara. The purpose of the Buddha-Dhamma is to eliminate this suffering and help them to attain Nirvana.

The Anatta concept

The Abhidharma denies the existence of a person or an individual. It accepts only fleeting thought moments which arise and flash instantly. In this process there is no person or being. The Buddha taught the Suttas to men on earth, referring to a person. In the Abhidharma he is supposed to have preached to the gods in which he denies the existence of a person or an individual. In order to bridge the gulf of this inconsistency the Abhidharma scholars invented the theory of two truths. The Sutras are true in the conventional sense, and the Abhidharma is true in the ultimate sense which is the highest truth.

The Puggalavadins could not accept the theory that the Buddha had taught two kinds of truth. Nowhere had he done so. The Theravadins cannot quote from any part of the Sutras where he has taught that there are two truths called Sammuti and Paramartha. Thus they refuted this contention and asserted that the Abhidharma Pitaka is a fabrication and required another concoction to maintain its validity. It is with the help of this fabrication that Abhidharma scholars reconcile the inconsistency in the Sutra and Abhidharma teachings.

The Southern School of Buddhism

Theravada Buddhism is Abhidharma oriented. All its commentaries and ancillary literature are written in a way to accommodate the Abhidarma. Ven. Buddhagosha asserted that the Abhidharma Pitaka is a teaching of the Buddha. But he himself admitted in the Atthasalini Commentary that there were ancient Sinhala Elders at Anuradhapura who challenged the validity of the Abhidharma Pitaka.

They pointed out that the Buddha had taught in the Mahaparinirvana Sutra that we should not accept teachings presented to us in his name if they are inconsistent with the Sutra and the Vinaya teachings. They also asserted that in the Anagatabhaya Sutra the Buddha envisaged a time when monks will cook up doctrines and scriptures not taught by him and present them as the Buddha-word. He admonished his followers to carefully compare such teachings with the Sutras and the Vinaya and accept them only if they are compatible and consistent.

Therefore Abhidharma being incompatible with the Sutra and Vinaya teaching was rejected by the Puggalawadins. The Sautrantika teachers too rejected the Abhidharma on the same grounds. The very name Sautrantika Sect means those who take only the Sutras as authoritative.

The controversy on Antarbhava

They accepted Abhidharma only to the extent that it is found in seed form in the Sutras. Another important teaching of the Puggalavadins was the doctrine of Antarabhava. The interim spirit existence between one life and another. This was denied by the Therevadins who asserted that the acceptance of Antarabhava by the Puggalavadins was due to a misunderstanding of some passages of the Sutras. The Puggalavadins maintained their position and showed that the misinterpretation of key passages is the work of Abhidharma oriented Theravada teachers, who tried to cut and hack the Buddha-word to suit their Abhidharma-oriented views. Their teaching was that their was no person, or being, but a mere flux of fleeting thought moments which are impersonal. The Puggalavadins considered this a bovine folly.

Between the 2nd and 3rd Council, the Theravadins had compiled 7 Abhidharma books and asserted that except one other were the teachings of the Buddha preached in the Tavatismsa heaven to the gods. Not to be outdone the Sarvastivadin teachers also compiled 7 Abhidharma books and adopted them as their Abhidharma Pitaka. They were candid and frank enough to reveal the names of the authors of the books, unlike the Theravadins who took up the position that their 7 books contained preachings of the Buddha to the gods in the Tavatimsa heaven.

The common denominator

But an examination of the two Abhidharma Pitakas show too many discrepancies whereas their Sutra and Vinaya Pitakas are similar. This is clear proof that the Abhidharma Pitaka was composed after the monks broke off into sects. The Puggalavadins taught that a person or a pudgala who performs good and bad deeds reaps the results and fares on in Sansara until the attainment of Nirvana. The Bharahara Surta was the favourite text of the Pudgalavadins. Therein Buddha said" Bhara have Panchakkhando, Bharaharo Ca Puggalo." This means the five aggregates are a burden, the puggala or person is the burden bearer.

Here clearly the Buddha distinguishes between the five groups of aggregates (skandas) and the person who bears them. But according to the Theravada Abhidharma the burden carries itself. There is no burden-bearer. This is what Buddhaghosha meant when he said in the Visuddhi Magga - the standard text of the Theravada - that" there is mere suffering but no sufferer exists". "There is the Noble Eightfold Path but no one traverses it". Buddhaghosha copied the idea from a verse in Nagarjuna’s Mula Madhyama Karika - his magnum opus in which he ennunciates his Madhyamika philosophy with its central doctrine of Sunyata - the void. According to this, the whole world and all its phenomena are mirage, a dream, an illusion or" a castle in the air" as Nagarjuna put it. This is the Hindu doctrine of Maya dressed up in a Buddhist garb.

The Puggalavadins taught that to deny the existence of a person is to bring down the whole edifice of the Buddha-Dharma. It is absurd to say that the burden carries itself, that mere suffering exists and there is no sufferer, or that the Path exists without anyone to tread the path. This is not Buddhism, it is the Buddhaghosha brand of Abhidharma Buddhism.

The self and no-self

The Puggalavadins point out that if there are no beings, the practise of Metta would not be possible, Karma and Rebirth would be meaningless, without a person faring on in Sansara. Memories of previous lives, the preaching of the Satipattana Sutra for the purification of beings and overcoming their sufferings would be meaningless, if there is no person.

The Buddha said, "One person is born among men for the welfare and happiness of beings". Hundreds of such texts can be quoted from the Sutras. To deny a person in the ultimate sense (the highest truth) and accept him in a conventional sense is to talk with two tongues and dilute the truth of the Buddha-word. The Sutta Nipata says that "Buddhas have no two words." "Truth is one and not many". (Ekam hi saccam na dutiyamatthi). Two contrary truths is foreign to the Buddha’s teaching.

The chief difference between Puggalavada and Theravada comes with the acceptance and non-acceptance of the Abhidharma Pitaka as a teaching of the Buddha. Theravada is steeped in Abhidharma and is abhidharma oriented. The Puggala vadins have only two Pitakas namely Sutra and Vinaya Pitakas. The Puggalavadins took care not to use the word Atman or soul as is understood in Vedanta, i.e. an immutable self characterised by permanence, bliss and substance.

The Puggala of the Pudgalavadins is a self that is subject to impermanence, unsatisfactoriness and is not to be considered as the essence or core for those reasons. This appears to be a halfway house between the Vedantic soul and the no-soul doctrine of the Theravadins. The Buddha is neither an anatmavadi nor atmavadi.

The Puggalavadins teach that the puggala arises simultaneously with the five aggregates, is not within or outside them, but forms a structural unit with them.

It is the astral body, secondary body or bio-plasamabody of modern Para-psychological research. Its existence and verifiability has been vindicated by 150 years of Psychical Research in the West in which very eminent scientists have taken part. It is the mano-kaya or the Suttas.

If Buddhism is to be a practical religion of value to mankind, it must take into account and recognise the existence of persons or individuals - otherwise Buddhism falls flat and collapses like a pack of cards. When you deny a person, you have to deny the Buddha, his Dhamma and the Sangha. That reduces Buddhism to a force.

As for myself, I try to look at it from the perspective of, In the end, who really knows? If we were to conclude now what the answer may be, without the insights born of the practice itself, it'd be little more than speculation; there'd be no 'gnosis,' no knowledge of the truth. And we're never asked by the Buddha to speculate about what he meant, nor are we told that we'll be freed by our conceptual thoughts of such. All that does is lead to what the Buddha called "a thicket of view" and to the propagation of those views (a mental form of samsara, literally 'wandering on'). In fact, I think the Suttas are quite clear that, as important as having an intellectual understanding of the teachings is, people who are serious about ending suffering will eventually need to put these teachings into practice to see whether they really do lead to a true and lasting happiness. Simply clinging to views of self certainly won't do it.

And what is clinging/sustenance? These four are clingings: sensuality clinging, view clinging, precept & practice clinging, and doctrine of self clinging. This is called clinging. (SN 12.2)

And with clinging comes what?

From ignorance as a requisite condition come fabrications. From fabrications as a requisite condition comes consciousness. From consciousness as a requisite condition comes name-&-form. From name-&-form as a requisite condition come the six sense media. From the six sense media as a requisite condition comes contact. From contact as a requisite condition comes feeling. From feeling as a requisite condition comes craving. From craving as a requisite condition comes clinging/sustenance. From clinging/sustenance as a requisite condition comes becoming. From becoming as a requisite condition comes birth. From birth as a requisite condition, then aging & death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, distress, & despair come into play. Such is the origination of this entire mass of stress & suffering. (SN 12.2)

That's right, stress and suffering (dukkha) eventually arises due to the sustenance of clinging. That's the danger of clinging, even to the idea of 'self' if such a thing exists. And this is important because the Buddha himself said that he didn't "envision a clinging to a doctrine of self, clinging to which there would not arise sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, & despair" (MN 22). And the Buddha only taught one thing:

Both formerly and now, monks, I declare only stress and the cessation of stress.

What this says to me is that, when we travel the path to put down all of our burdens, we must be careful not pick up more along the way. This includes the burden of self-view in any of its subtle forms. That's where the Puggalavadins seem to go wrong in one respect. Their views, whether right or wrong in the ultimate sense, are sustenance for clinging, especially if we see that the idea of a 'person' beyond the conventional sense is, for all intents and purposes, a doctrine of self. And while their interpretation of the teachings on not-self does offer a possible explanation of how kamma and rebirth work, they fail in keeping to the Buddha's overall teachings. In just these three lines, the Buddha leaves no ground for any type of self-view to gain a foothold:

Sabbe sankhara dukkha. (All processes are stressful.)
Sabbe sankhara anicca. (All processes are inconstant.)
Sabbe dhamma anatta. (All phenomena are not-self.)

For us unawakened worldlings (puthujjana), it seems that the quest continues. We each undertake this journey with the hope of finding out these answers for ourselves, to find our own freedom from dukkha. There's not much certainty in this world, even in Buddhism it sometimes seems, but there's one thing I think we can have confidence in—the noble eightfold path.

I've come to the conclusion that the answer to the question, Who am I? isn't important. What's really important, however, is realizing that our attachment to views and doctrines of self keep us rooted in "perceptions and categories of objectification" that continually assail us and our mental well-being (MN 18). One must clear away all views, opinions and preconceived notions about self, and cut at the very roots of such attachments to gain release. It's through a combination of meditation and contemplation of the five aggregates that we can develop the insight into the teachings on not-self that's beyond mere speculation, and rests instead within the realm of direct experience. That kind of insight is the only kind that leads to real freedom, not simply repeating the formula, 'All things are not-self.'

interview

Here's an interview of sorts I did via PM with a member at dhammawheel.com:

Laurens: I thought I would start by asking you about what your personal take on Buddhism is, which teachers you follow and the kind of practice that you undertake.

Me: Well, I think that Buddhism can be seem from many different angles, but I prefer to see it as a type of 'transcendent psychology.' I think that a critical analysis of the earliest texts reveals a much more pragmatic and specialized method of mental training than many people (traditional Buddhists and Western converts alike) realize—one that seeks to diminish and even eliminate suffering by radically changing the way the mind relates to experience.

As for myself, I've had many teachers, and almost all of them are Thai Theravada. My first teacher was Ajahn Chuen from the Midwest Buddhist Meditation Center in Warren, MI. Sadly, he passed away a few years ago. I also visited Wat Dhammasala frequently when I lived in Michigan, and practiced with Ajahn Khemasanto. After I moved to California, I started going to Wat Buddhanusorn and practiced with Ajahn Prasert, as well as with Ayya Tathaaloka, who was also a student of his at the time. My most recent teacher is Ven. Fa Thai, a Thai monk who is now in charge of a Taiwanese Mahayana temple called Miao Fa Chan Temple in Portland, Oregon, although I haven't been there in some time. In addition, I gain a great deal of inspiration and practical insights from Thai Forest teachers such as Thanissaro Bhikkhu, who makes his way up to Portland about once a year.

My meditation practice has mainly centred around mindfulness of breathing (anapanasati), although for the past few years I've been doing more studying than anything.

L: Would you say that the essence of Buddhism stands clear consistently in the scriptures that you study? Some religion's important messages are completely lost when in comes to interpretation of scripture (look at the number of different sects of Christianity) - why is Buddhism different?

I noticed that there seems to be a very mild evolution of the teachings in different cultures, but it struck me how the essentials of Buddhism remained pretty consistent throughout. Something that you couldn't say about all religions.

Me: Yes, I'd say that the essence of what the Buddha is recorded as saying in the Pali Canon is fairly consistent throughout. I think this is mainly due to the fact that the Buddha was a superbly gifted teacher, and that, despite evidence of later additions and modifications, much of what he taught seems to have been faithfully passed down by his disciples.

If you analyze other religious texts, such as the Bible or the Mahabharata, for example, there's evidence of layers of authorship (even in places where there is said to be only one author), and you can literally trace the evolution of these texts via changes in style, grammar and content.

The core of Pali Canon, however, shows evidence of originating from a single source through its consistency of content. As Prof. Richard Gombrich puts it, "I find (as Buddhists have always found) that the central part of the Canon... presents such originality, intelligence, grandeur and - most relevantly - coherence, that it is hard to see it as a composite works" (Theravada Buddhism, pg. 20).

I'm not completely sure why this is, but I think the methods of preservation may have had something to do with it. At the beginning, this included memorization of suttas by large groups of monks, who would then have periodic councils where they would recite and compare various recitations in order to weed out alterations and distortions. This was later done with written texts, as well.

L: I got the feeling too that Gotama was a gifted teacher. I feel however, that in the centuries since his death mankind has built a religious organization around him. My opinion is that the Buddha was aware that this may have been the case because he instructed his followers to essentially not make idols of him [I can't find a reference for that at some point, I will add it later, I thought I'd get the question out there first]. Yet we did, and there is a lot of superstition that has developed around 'gaining merit' and bowing to giant statues creating rituals and so forth . I think this says a lot about religion, and mankind's tendency to make idols and ritualistic behaviour. I don't think the Buddha intended to gain worship, I think he intended to have the focus on his teachings only.

What, if any, do you think are the differences between 'Dhamma' (in this context meaning the essential teachings of the Buddha) and Buddhism the religion?

Local customs, deities and religious practices have certainly found their way into Buddhism wherever it's been established. As such, I think there are quite a few difference between what the Buddha taught and Buddhism as a traditional religious institution. Take the Thai tradition of amulet making and the water blessing ceremony, for example. The Buddha didn't teach anything like these, but they've made their way into Buddhism anyway, even despite the whole 'not clinging to rites and rituals' thing.

I mean, there's nothing inherently wrong with having an amulet to remind you of the practice, or participating in a water blessing ceremony. Hell, I'll admit that I like to get sprinkled as much as the next person. But I also don't think that amulets can protect me from bullets or make me successful, and I know that only meditation and contemplation can cleanse my mind, not a splash of H2O in the face.

L: I have a theory that a lot of Westerners, particularly in America turn towards Buddhism as a reaction to Christianity. The reason I say particularly in America, is because in America Christianity is often associated with right-wing conservatism - which for some, holds negative connotations. I think that Buddhism provides a liberally minded, peaceful alternative to the often intolerant views of the Christian right, and therefore it wouldn't surprise me if there were some that turned to Buddhism as a kind of backlash against the faith that they were brought up in. I am by no means saying that this is the case for all Westerners, but it wouldn't surprise me if this was a factor in the spread of Buddhism to the West. Do you think that there is any weight to this notion?

It would be interesting for me to know also, if you were raised in a Christian family?

Me: I think there's some truth to that. Most of the Buddhists I know were raised in a Christian family. As for myself, I was lucky in that I raised without any kind of religious upbringing whatsoever, so I was free to explore my own spirituality without constrainment.

As a child, I began my spiritual exploration out of shear curiosity, beginning with Greek and Roman mythology. I used to love looking through the dictionary to find names of various gods and goddesses and read all about them. From there, I branched out to Egyptian, Norse and other ancient myths. I eventually got my Mom to buy me some books about mythology like Edith Hamilton's Mythology: Timeless Tales of Gods and Heroes and Kevin Crossley-Holland's The Norse Myths.

At some point, I became interested in Christianity for a brief period. I was under the assumption that since so many people believed in God, God must exist. I mean, why else would there be so many churches and television shows about God? But, after researching more about Christian theology, I began to have some serious doubts. I discovered alternative views, especially those of the Gnostics. Later, during the majority of my adolescence, I found myself drawn to LeVay-style Satanism until I was introduced to a witch and began practicing Paganism and Witchcraft. (Those were some interesting times.)

When I was around 24 [I'm currently 32], I discovered Buddhism after visiting a Thai Theravada temple near my house. I spent a lot of time visiting the temple and meditating, especially during some really difficult times, and I had a feeling that this path had more potential for my spiritual growth and well-being than any I'd previously undertaken (including materialistic self-indulgence). It's been a big influence on me ever since.

L: Can you tell me more about meditation? How does it relate to the teachings, and how did it help during difficult times?

Me: The way I see it, craving (tahna) is the cause of suffering (dukkha), and to end suffering its cause must be removed; the difficulty arises when it comes to how exactly this is done. My theory is that craving is a very subtle but powerful aspect of our psychology. It's there, latent in the mind, waiting to exert its influence through mental fabrications (sankhara) by directing or at the very least encouraging the mind to feed upon sensory experiences via the five clinging-aggregates (upadana-khandha) in an unhealthy way.

The problem is that these processes of subtle movement in the mind are so subtle that they are almost impossible to discern as they are taking place. That's where I believe meditation comes in: meditation helps to calm and still the mind so that these mental events become easier and easier to observe. One, in effect, uses conditionality in order to fabricate controlled states of mental absorption (jhana) until they're able to discern the presence of craving, its movement in the mind, and the fact that even these refined and subtle states of mental absorption are ultimately stressful and unsatisfactory. This leads one to develop dispassion (viraga), and dispassion leads one to cease fabrication thus opening the doors to the deathless (amata) by ending the chain of causation (paticca-samuppada).

As for how I've experienced meditation personally, that's difficult to describe. I've experienced states of clam, and occasionally feelings of pleasure that permeated my whole body when I was meditating regularly, but those experiences are rare and, sadly, I've let my meditation practice slide for some time.

When I was going through a really difficult time, though, I really looked forward to evening chanting and meditation at the Midwest Buddhist Meditation Center. It helped keep me sane and allowed me to deal with some things that I normally wouldn't have been able to deal with. For me, it was like a shelter in a storm. I also had a hard time eating because I was so upset and my stomach would just get so tight I couldn't eat anything. After meditation, however, my stomach would usually relax and I was able to go to my favourite Thai restaurant and eat. Lucky for me I just happened to start meditating before shit hit the fan, otherwise I'm not sure what I would've done. Probably would've just drank myself stupid or something.

L: Are their any popular misconceptions about Buddhism, or Buddhist practice that you would like to address?

Me: Heh, lots, (e.g., anatta, kamma, the idea that Buddhism teaches life is suffering, etc.)

L: What are your views on the various kinds of religious extremism that we see in the world?

What advice would you give to a religious extremist if you could?

Me: I have mixed ideas about this. On the one hand, religion is, among other things, a creative expression of our search for happiness, meaning and truth in a seemingly infinite universe. Religion can be a beautiful thing that brings communities together, as well as bring individuals closer to a happiness that transcends much of the suffering and unsatisfactoriness seemingly inherent in this fragile thing we call life.

On the other hand, religion is being used to justify and even instigate violence and oppression, and that's a real problem; although, I think that when you dig a little bit deeper, it becomes apparent that there's a lot more going on than meets the eye. For one thing, it's not just the religions themselves that need to be scrutinized, but also the cultures that are influenced by these religious traditions.

I think it's fair to say that certain people and cultures are more intolerant and prone to use religious teachings to justify violence, but I'm not sure it's fair to single out a specific religion, such as Islam, for example, because, they way I see it, it's not religion that makes people dangerous so much as it's people who make religion dangerous. And the same can be said about almost anything, especially political ideologies.

As for what I would say to a religious extremist, I don't know. The problem is, how can you talk to a person about this in a rational way when they're not necessarily in a rational states of mind? I doubt anything I could say would have any affect on someone unless they were at least somewhat open to hearing what I had to say; but when you're sure you have the Truth™, you're often not listening, I mean really listening, to what other people have to say.

I've heard people express their desire to "kill religion" (e.g., Dawkins et al.), and I can understand some of their reasoning for making such statements, especially when you have people using religion to justify suicide bombing and discrimination against gays, women, etc., but I also can't help but think that doing so would come at a great cost to humanity in that we'd be losing an important part of what makes us human.